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MONEY AS INFRASTRUCTURE
Morgan Ricks*
Traditional infrastructure regulation-the law of regulated
industries-rests atop three pillars: rate regulation, entry
restriction, and universal service. This mode of regulation has
typically been applied to providers of network-type resources:
resources that are optimally supplied as integrated systems.
The monetary system is such a resource; and money creation is
the distinctive function of banks. Bank regulation can therefore
be understood as a subfield of infrastructure regulation. With
few exceptions, modern academic treatments of banking have
emphasized banks' intermediation function and downplayed
or ignored their monetary function. Concomitantly, in recent
decades U.S. bank regulation has strayed from its
infrastructural roots. This regulatory drift has been unwise.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two competing paradigms have long dominated
understandings of banking and its regulation. One paradigm
sees banking first and foremost as a species of financial
intermediation. Under this intermediation paradigm-which
has reigned supreme for decades-banks are understood to be
primarily in the business of "taking funds" from depositors
and then "lending them out." Banks thereby connect savers
and borrowers.1 '[B]anking' [has] become virtually
synonymous with financial intermediation," writes Richard
Posner, in a typical example from this vein.2 "I . . . use the
words 'bank' and 'banking' broadly, to encompass all financial
intermediaries [.]"3
The other paradigm can be called the money paradigm. It
views banks as distinctly monetary institutions. This means
something more than offering payment services, though that
is certainly part of it.4 The money paradigm recognizes that
claims on banks are, in a real sense, money, and that banks
1 For a recent, broad critique of this paradigm, see Robert C. Hockett
& Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143,
1144-67 (2017).
2 RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND
THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 46 (2009).
3 Id. at xvi.
4 Hence defining banks as "financial intermediaries that offer payment
services" doesn't quite capture it. See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN
R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 65
(6th ed. 2017) (emphasis omitted).
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thus augment the money supply. Rather than seeing banks as
taking funds that are then lent out, the money paradigm sees
banks primarily as issuers of "funds."5 (Needless to say, taking
and issuing are opposites.) On this view, banks are an integral
part of the overall monetary framework, a status that justifies
a unique relationship with the state.
The two paradigms are not strictly incompatible; most
banking experts would probably find truth in both of them.
6
But they coexist in uneasy tension. While the intermediation
paradigm emphasizes the similarities between banks and
other financial institutions, the money paradigm stresses
their differences. While the intermediation paradigm tends to
focus more on the left side of banks' balance sheets (i.e., their
5 This point is sometimes conveyed by "loans create deposits" and
similar expressions. See, e.g., IRVING FISHER, THE PURCHASING POWER OF
MONEY 39 (rev. ed. 1920) ("A bank depositor... has not ordinarily 'deposited
money'[.]"); JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE PURE THEORY OF MONEY 25 (1930)
("Practical bankers ... have [concluded] ... that the banks can lend no more
than their depositors have previously entrusted to them. But economists
cannot accept this as being the common-sense which it pretends to be."); J.
LAURENCE LAUGHLIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF MONEY 119 (1919) ("A loan is
inevitably followed by the creation of a deposit account in favor of the
borrower; as yet no money is paid out or comes in."); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1114 (1954) ("It is much more realistic to
say that banks . . . create deposits in their act of lending, than to say that
they lend the deposits that have been entrusted to them."); Frank A.
Vanderlip, The Modern Bank, in THE CURRENCY PROBLEM AND THE PRESENT
FINANCIAL SITUATION: A SERIES OF ADDRESSES DELIVERED AT COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY, 1907-1908 1, 5 (1908) ("It is a misconception to suppose that a
bank first accumulates deposits and then loans them out to borrowers. The
operation is the reverse. The bank first makes a loan to the borrower and in
so doing creates a deposit."); L. RANDALL WRAY, MONEY AND CREDIT IN
CAPITALIST ECONOMIES: THE ENDOGENOUS MONEY APPROACH 73 (1990)
("[L]oans make deposits[.]"); Michael McLeay, Amar Radia & Ryland
Thomas, Money Creation in the Modern Economy, 2014 BANK ENGLAND Q.
BULL. 14, 15 ("[It is a] common misconception ... that banks act simply as
intermediaries, lending out the deposits that savers place with them ....
[Tihe act of lending creates deposits - the reverse of the sequence typically
described in textbooks.").
6 For instance, Posner refers in passing to banks' role in "expanding
and contracting the supply of money." POSNER, supra note 2, at 20.
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asset portfolios), the money paradigm is more concerned with
the right side (i.e., liabilities that function as money). While
the intermediation paradigm sees banks as private
institutions, the money paradigm highlights their public
dimension as central components of the monetary system.
While the intermediation paradigm finds little that is special
about banks,7 the money paradigm asserts that banks are
indeed special.8
The money paradigm dominated Anglo-American banking
thought during the nineteenth century.9 Over the course of
the twentieth century, however, the intermediation paradigm
gradually assumed primacy. Among the likely explanations
for this eclipse, two stand out. The first has to do with the
formal attributes of banks' monetary liabilities. In the
nineteenth century, the prototypical bank liability was the
bank note: a tangible piece of paper that circulated as money.
By the early twentieth century, the checkable deposit account
had largely supplanted the private bank note. Now, in
economic substance, bank notes and transaction accounts are
virtually identical. Both are demandable claims, puttable to
the bank at par, that function as money. (Bank notes are
paper money, whereas deposit balances can be understood as
"account money.") But the physicality of the bank note made
its monetary function much more conspicuous. Bank notes
were plainly issued. As the transition from notes to accounts
unfolded, numerous prominent authorities insisted on the
7 See Richard C. Aspinwall, On the "Specialness" of Banking, 7 ISSUES
BANK REG. 16, 16-18 (1983).
8 See E. GERALD CORRIGAN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS,
ANNUAL REPORT 1982: ARE BANKS SPECIAL? (1982),
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/annual-reports/ar/annual-
report- 1982-complete-text [https://perma.cc/XY24- 7QDD].
9 See, e.g., BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIL WAR 186 (1957) (noting that in the early years of
the republic, "[t]he impression was general that the exercise of the banking
function without express authorization from the sovereign power was
improper" because "banks, being by nature imbued with monetary powers,
were in a peculiar sense responsible to the state.").
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functional equivalence of these two types of claims.10 That
they felt the need to do so testifies to the conceptual difficulty
that deposit accounts posed in many minds. Even today, the
idea that bank accounts are tantamount to uncertificated
bank notes is a source of puzzlement, though no one has
trouble understanding that securities can be uncertificated."
The second likely explanation for the intermediation
paradigm's victory in the twentieth century was the rise and
pervasive influence of finance as a discipline.1 2 The story of
finance's midcentury ascent within academic economics has
10 See, e.g., CHARLES F. DUNBAR, THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF BANKING
63 (3rd ed. 1917) ("Legislators have generally failed to perceive the
similarity of the two kinds of liability[.]"); ALBERT GALLATIN, Considerations
on the Currency and Banking System of the United States (1831), reprinted
in 3 THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN 231, 267-68 (Henry Adams ed.,
1879) ('The bank-notes and the deposits rest precisely on the same basis
.... We can in no respect whatever perceive the slightest difference between
the two[.]"); HENRY DUNNING MACLEOD, 1 THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
BANKING 331 (4th ed. 1883) ("It is ... a fundamental error to divide banks
into 'Banks of Deposit' and 'Banks of Issue.' All banks are 'Banks of Issue,"');
SCHUMPETER, supra note 5, at 1115 ("[T]he obvious truth [is] that deposits
and banknotes are fundamentally the same thing."); LUDWIG VON MISES,
THE THEORY OF MONEYAND CREDIT 53 (H. E. Batson trans., Yale Univ. Press
1953) (1912) ("[B]anknotes, say, and cash deposits differ only in mere
externals, important perhaps from the business and legal points of view, but
quite insignificant from the point of view of economics."); Charles F. Dunbar,
Deposits as Currency, 1 Q.J. ECON. 401, 402 (1887) ('The ease with which
we ignore deposits as a part of the currency seems the more remarkable,
when we consider that.., it is a circulating medium in as true a sense and
in the same sense as the bank-note, and that, like the bank-note, it is
created by the bank and for the same purposes."); A. Mitchell Innes, What
is Money?, 30 BANKING L.J. 377, 407 (1913) ("A bank note differs in no
essential way from an entry in the deposit register of a bank.").
11 See U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(18) (AM. LAW INST. 2017) (defining
"uncertificated security").
12 This seems to be what Perry Mehrling had in mind in describing the
shift from a "money" view to essentially a "finance" view in the middle
decades of the twentieth century. See PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD
STREET: HOW THE FED BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT 2-6 (2011).
No. 3:7571
been recounted elsewhere and need not be repeated here.13 It
is enough to note that among its core postulates is that a firm's
financing structure is irrelevant to its value, provided certain
conditions are met.1 4 The right side of the balance sheet
merely divvies up the pie, nothing more. These ideas had
imperial reach, and they strongly influenced understandings
of banking. By 1963, future Nobel-winning economist James
Tobin, who had previously applied new concepts from portfolio
theory to the analysis of money demand,15 was promoting a
"new view" of banking, holding that "[t]he distinction between
commercial banks and other financial intermediaries has
been too sharply drawn."1 6 The title of his article-
Commercial Banks as Creators of "'Money" (note the scare
quotes around money)-says it all.
By no means did the money paradigm completely
disappear. Textbooks on macroeconomics and on money and
banking have continued to dutifully describe banks as engines
of money creation.17 But, in truth, this seems to have more to
do with pedagogical inertia than with any kind of deep
disciplinary commitment.18 Tellingly, within academic
economics, leading modern theories of banking omit money
entirely.19 Banks are modeled as pure intermediaries. It is
13 A brief overview can be found in the preface to the 2A HANDBOOK OF
THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE xxv-xxxii (George M. Constantinides, Milton
Harris, Rene Stultz eds., 2013).
14 The canonical paper is Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The
Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM.
ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
15 See James Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk, 25
REV. ECON. STUD. 65, 67 (1958).
16 James Tobin, Commercial Banks as Creators of "Money," in BANKING
AND MONETARY STUDIES 408, 410, 418 (Deane Carson ed., 1963).
17 See, e.g., FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING,
AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 334-39 (10th ed. 2013).
18 Indeed, Tobin began his essay by mocking the standard pedagogy.
See supra note 16, at 408.
19 The most influential economic model of banking-the Diamond-
Dybvig model-has no role for money. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H.
Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401,
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against this backdrop that two prominent economists could
recently write that the notion that banks "create money...
rests on an abuse of the word 'money.'
20
Ideas about banking naturally influence theories of bank
regulation. In an influential 1976 article, The Soundness of
Financial Intermediaries, Robert Clark expressed deep
skepticism that banks' monetary function had much if
anything to do with their regulation.21 The article's title
leaves no doubt as to which paradigm it adopts. Not long
thereafter, regulators followed suit. In 1987, as part of a
general deregulatory trend, the primary U.S. federal banking
regulator stated that it was moving beyond the "textbook
sense" of banking-what this Article calls the money
paradigm-and toward a "modern concept of banking as funds
intermediation."22
In the years since the global financial crisis of 2007-2009,
though, the money paradigm has enjoyed something of a
402-05 (1983). Critics have noted that in the Diamond-Dybvig model,
"agents are essentially isolated from each other; there is no trade with other
agents where 'money' buys goods .... Agents trade only with the bank."
Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, Financial Intermediation, in 1 A HANDBOOK
OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 431, 453 (George M. Constantinides, Milton
Harris, Rene Stultz eds., 2003). Another leading theory of banking-the
Calomiris-Kahn theory-explicitly posits that "liquidity demand is absent"
and "there is no demand for transactability." Charles W. Calomiris &
Charles M. Kahn, The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal
Banking Arrangements, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 497, 500 n.8, 508 (1991). For a
more extensive treatment of the relevant economic literature, see MORGAN
RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION 81-90
(2016).
20 Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, The Parade of Bankers'New Clothes
Continues: 31 Flawed Claims Debunked 8 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance
at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 143, 2015); cf. Paul Krugman,
Opinion, If Banks Are Outlawed, Only Outlaws Will Have Banks, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2011, https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/10/if-
banks-are-outlawed-only-outlaws-will-have-banks [https://perma.ccIK55D-
9EWV] ("[W]hat banks do .... [is] not mostly about money creation!").
21 See Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial
Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 23-26 (1976).
22 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, No-Objection Letter No.
87-5, at *5,1987 WL 267920 (July 20, 1987).
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resurgence. Strangely enough, the locus of this
counteroffensive has been not the banking system proper but
the so-called "shadow" banking system. Experts define
shadow banking in different ways, but pretty much everyone
agrees that heavy reliance on short-term debt is a big part of
it.23 In other words, shadow banking involves a particular
liability structure. And leading authorities have begun to
emphasize that the financial sector's short-term debt has a
distinctly monetary character.24 Gary Gorton, a leader in this
field, refers to various types of financial sector short-term debt
as "forms of money" and "private money."25 Harvard
economist and former Federal Reserve governor Jeremy Stein
says that the financial sector's short-term debt obligations are
"private 'money"' and offer "monetary services."26 John
Cochrane, a top finance and macroeconomic specialist, notes
"short-term debt is money."27
Policymakers have taken note. In a 2016 speech, Daniel
Tarullo, who was then on the Federal Reserve Board, observed
that such short-term debt instruments exhibit "features
23 See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., ASSESSMENT OF SHADOW BANKING
ACTIVITIES, RISKS AND THE ADEQUACY OF POST-CRISIS POLICY TOOLS TO
ADDRESS FINANCIAL STABILITY CONCERNS 6-7 (2017).
24 This is an old idea but it had been largely dormant for some time.
See, e.g., J.R. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL 168 (2nd ed. 1946) ("Bills of short
maturity ... [are] not quite perfect money, but still very close substitutes
for it."); JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT
INTEREST AND MONEY 167 n. 1 (1936) (averring that "we can treat as money"
debt instruments with a maturity not "in excess of three months[.]"); HENRY
C. SIMONS, A POSITIVE PROGRAM FOR LAISSEZ FAIRE: SOME PROPOSALS FOR A
LIBERAL ECONOMIC POLICY (1934), reprinted in ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE
SOCIETY 320 n.7 (1948) ("Short-term debts ... are.., closely akin to money
and demand deposits[.]").
25 GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE
DON'T SEE THEM COMING 5 (2012); Gary Gorton & Guillermo Ordofiez,
Collateral Crises, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 343, 343 (2014).
26 Jeremy C. Stein, Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation,
127 Q.J. ECON. 57, 58 (2012).
27 John H. Cochrane, Toward a Run-Free Financial System, in ACROSS
THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 224 (Martin
Neil Baily & John B. Taylor eds., 2014).
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sometimes characterized as 'money-like."'28 Their "private
creation," he said, "is, at least to some degree, the creation of
money outside of the operations of central banks or of
depository institutions subject to reserve requirements and
other regulations."
29
Legal scholars have only just begun to examine the
regulatory implications that would follow from taking the
money paradigm seriously.30 To see what is at stake here, note
that the two paradigms start from strikingly different
institutional baselines. In the intermediation paradigm,
banking is fundamentally a private activity that arises in the
competitive marketplace. It may give rise to certain kinds of
problems (instability foremost among them) that justify
regulation, but such regulation is seen as a necessary evil and
should be designed so as not to unduly interfere with market
outcomes. Unquestionably, basic business matters-such as
how much interest is paid on bank accounts, or who gets
access to a bank account-should be left free from regulatory
meddling, apart from generally applicable marketplace rules
(consumer protection, antifraud, and so forth). Regulatory
interference with such business matters is anathema to the
intermediation paradigm. Entry restriction is likewise
strongly disfavored as inimical to competitive market
outcomes.
The money paradigm starts in a completely different place.
Rather than seeing bank money creation as a legitimate
private activity that is then regulated, it sees money creation
28 Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Opening Remarks at the Center for American Progress and Americans
for Financial Reform Conference, Exploring Shadow Banking: Can the




30 I have explored some of these issues in previous work. See RICKS,
supra note 19 at 84-85; see also Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and
Shadow Banking, 103 VA. L. REV. 411, 469 (2017).
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as an intrinsically public activity that is then outsourced.31
The institutional baseline, then, is direct public provisioning.
Insofar as banks are engaged in money creation, they do so
pursuant to what amounts to a franchise arrangement.32
Notably, if the government chose not to outsource money
creation-if, say, everyone held their transaction accounts
directly with the central bank-then the notion that the
interest paid on such accounts should be determined by
"market forces" would be nonsensical. Surely the monetary
authority would determine this interest rate in the conduct of
monetary policy, based on macroeconomic conditions.33 By
similar logic, under direct government provisioning the
government might conclude that broad or even universal
access to transaction accounts would serve the public interest,
even if this meant serving some users below cost. Many
government services work this way. Crucially, the decision to
31 Even Milton Friedman-a champion of laissez faire in other areas-
called the provision of a stable monetary framework "an essential
governmental function on a par with the provision of a stable legal
framework." MILTON FRIEDMAN, A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY STABILITY 8
(1960); see also SUBCOMM. ON ECON. IN GOV'T, 91ST CONG., THE ANALYSIS AND
EVALUATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES: THE PPB SYSTEM 47, 48 (Joint
Comm. Print 1969) (Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic
Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket
Allocation) ("The creation of money is in many respects an example of a
public good."); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS,
PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 19 (6th ed. 2011)
("Money is a public good[.]"); DAVID LAIDLER, TAKING MONEY SERIOUSLY 47
(1990) ("[T]here is something of the nature of a public good about money[.]");
James M. Buchanan, The Constitutionalization of Money, 30 CATO J. 251,
251 ("The market will not work effectively with monetary anarchy."); John
Cochrane, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (May 16,
2016), https://youtu.be/QcidqjmxPyk?t=7651 [https://perma.cc/R6GU-
GUGS] ("There's a few things the government has a natural monopoly in...
: national defense, courts, property rights, and I think money[.]"). For a
contrary, laissez-faire perspective, see LAWRENCE H. WHITE, THE THEORY OF
MONETARY INSTITUTIONS 88-119 (1999).
32 Cf. Hockett & Omarova, supra note 1, at 1147. Hockett and Omarova
apply their franchise conception to the financial system as a whole, whereas
my focus here (the monetary framework) is much narrower.
33 See infra Part II.
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outsource has no necessary bearing on these decisions. This is
government procurement and the government must supply
the specifications. The overall package must be attractive
enough to induce private sector participation, but no
particular term of the package is dictated by the mere fact of
outsourcing. Finally, in the money paradigm, entry restriction
is not disfavored. In fact, it is implied by the franchise
arrangement. Administrative controls over deposit rates
would alleviate concerns about the anticompetitive effects of
entry restriction, since competition would not be relied upon
to discipline prices.
The money paradigm's implicit institutional baseline
points toward an unexpected connection to another, seemingly
unrelated area of administrative regulation. In the study of
"regulated industries"-also known as infrastructure
industries, network industries, or public utilities and common
carriers-the outsourcing or procurement-contracting
framework is perhaps the dominant mode of analysis.
34
Harold Demsetz inaugurated this mode of contractual
analysis in a classic 1968 article in which he suggested that
"franchise bidding" might be used in lieu of administrative
regulation in these industries.35 Prospective service providers
would submit competitive bids to offer the service in question,
and the governing authority would select the most favorable
bid. Competition for the market (as opposed to within the
market) would protect consumers against supracompetitive
prices, as pricing and terms of service would be locked in
upfront. Contractual enforcement through courts would
substitute for regulatory commissions or agencies. Other
34 The legal study of regulated industries is generally understood to
encompass certain portions of the energy, communication, and
transportation sectors, but not banking. See, e.g., W. KIP ViscusI, JOSEPH E.
HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND
ANTITRUST vii-xii, at 397 (4th ed. 2005); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W.
Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 1323, 1327 (1998);.
35 Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11. J.L. & ECON. 55, 56-57
(1968).
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scholars have convincingly argued that this explicit long-term
contracting strategy poses serious difficulties, involving such
issues as contractual incompleteness and uncertainty.36 Still,
experts have continued to use the procurement-contracting or
outsourcing framework as an analytical device in the area of
infrastructure regulation.37
Notably, the three regulatory devices just mentioned-rate
regulation, entry restriction, and universal service
requirements-feature prominently in infrastructure
regulation. When it comes to banking, each of these devices is
highly suspect under the intermediation paradigm but can be
readily entertained under the money paradigm. The
implication is startling: Insofar as the money paradigm has
merit, bank regulation may have very little in common with,
say, mutual fund regulation, in which financial
intermediation is paramount. Bank regulation instead
becomes a subfield of public utility and common carrier
36 See, e.g., Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, Regulation and
Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from Transaction-Cost
Economics for Public Utility Regulation, 9 J. REG. ECON. 5, 9, 18 (1996);
Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON.
426, 428, 444 (1976); George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and
the "Theories of Regulation" Debate, 36 J.L. & ECON. 289, 302 (1993); Oliver
E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding and Natural Monopolies-In General and
with Respect o CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73, 80-82 (1976).
37 See, e.g., Jose A. G6MEZ-IB&EZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE:
MONOPOLY, CONTRACTS, AND DISCRETION 3 (2003) ("[T]he problem of
infrastructure monopoly is similar to any other long-term contracting
problem, and particularly analogous to contracting in private sector
procurement."); Paul L. Joskow, The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in
Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 66
(1991) ("[T]he set of regulatory rules and procedures that determine the
prices that a regulated firm can charge are usefully conceptualized as a set
of incentive or procurement contracts that link the regulator as a principal
seeking to achieve some social or political objective and the regulated firm
as the agent supplying goods and services[.]"); Paul L. Joskow & Richard
Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. ON REG.
1, 8 (1986) ("[1]t is useful to think of the regulatory process embodied in
established regulatory procedures as a long-term 'regulatory contract'
between electricity customers, represented by the public utility commission,
and the utility.").
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regulation. (It bears emphasis that banks' legal monopoly has
nothing to do with lending-anyone can lend-but rather with
the provision of "deposit" accounts,38 which are widely
acknowledged to be a form of money.)
That bank regulation and infrastructure regulation might
enjoy a close kinship-as the money paradigm implies-is
seldom recognized in the regulatory literature.39 This is yet
another sign of the intermediation paradigm's dominance.
Unsurprisingly, the features of U.S. bank regulation most
closely resembling infrastructure regulation were curtailed
decades ago. With respect to entry restriction, for example, in
1980 the primary federal bank regulator relaxed its
longstanding policy of granting new charters based on public
convenience and necessity.40 It concluded instead that "the
marketplace normally is the best regulator of economic
activity; and competition allows the marketplace to
function[.]" 41 As for rate regulation, the story is well known to
students of banking history. The New Deal system of bank
regulation imposed controls on deposit interest rates, known
as Regulation Q. These controls were largely phased out in the
1980s.42 The direction of post-New Deal banking law, then,
has generally been to shed features resembling infrastructure
regulation. In the academic literature, these departures have
gone almost completely unlamented.
38 See 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(2) (2012).
39 This is not to say that it is never recognized. See Daniel R. Fischel,
Andrew M. Rosenfield & Robert S. Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and
Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 302-03 (1987) ("[Wihat is
most striking about the New Deal program of banking regulation is its
similarity to the programs of public utility and common carrier regulation,
many of which.., were established during the same period."). For a more
recent treatment that focuses on financial stability issues, see Prasad
Krishnamurthy, George Stigler on His Head: The Consequences of
Restrictions on Competition in (Bank) Regulation, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 823,
844, 849 (2018).
40 See infra notes 183-193 and accompanying text.
41 Clarification and Revision of Charter Policy, 45 Fed. Reg. 68,603,
68,604 (Oct. 15, 1980).
42 See infra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
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This Article illuminates a different path that bank
regulation might have followed (and still could). Rather than
abandoning those features that resemble infrastructure
regulation, bank regulation might instead embrace
infrastructure regulation's logic and follow through on its
implications. This Article explores compelling-and
previously overlooked-rationales for imposing rate
regulation, entry restriction, and universal service mandates
on "banking," understood as the activity of money creation or
augmentation. The infrastructure framing is crucial here
because it establishes that these devices are part and parcel
of a preexisting regulatory model. They are thoroughly
domesticated within regulatory theory and practice. Thus,
adopting the money paradigm would not necessitate new
concepts or modes of regulation. Far from creating a new
regulatory type, the task is one of shifting banking within our
existing institutional taxonomy.
Before proceeding, a point of clarification is in order. Over
the years, and with increasing frequency lately, analysts have
put forward various "public utility" views of banking. These
treatments have tended to be pitched at a high level of
abstraction. As a rule, they focus heavily on banks' credit
allocation (i.e., lending) function, arguing that it should be
harnessed to egalitarian social ends.43 Such arguments
43 See, e.g., Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283, 1342 (2014); K. Sabeel Rahman, The New
Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public
Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1690-91 (2018); Alan M. White,
Banks as Utilities, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1241, 1283 (2016). In recent years, some
Federal Reserve officials have used "public utility" language in reference to
banks, though their meaning has not been entirely clear. See Neel Kashkari,
President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Lessons from the
Crisis: Ending Too Big to Fail, Remarks at the Brookings Institution 5 (Feb.
16, 2016) (transcript available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/KashkariBrookings2l62016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C5PN-QEXN]) (suggesting that policymakers consider
"turning large banks into public utilities"); Joe Rauch, Big Banks are
Government-Backed: Fed's Hoenig, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2011),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fed-hoenig/big-banks-are-government-
backed-feds-hoenig-idUSTRE73B3S820110412 [https://perma.cc/2HG4-
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obviously raise hotly contested questions of political
philosophy. Even those sympathetic on philosophical grounds
may question whether credit markets are an effective vehicle
for social policy, whether the banking system is a suitable
instrument to implement this type of policy, or whether it is
wise to place such issues within the remit of bank regulators.
By contrast, my arguments-which relate exclusively to
banks' monetary function and not their lending or investment
activities-are for the most part grounded in efficiency norms,
thus sidestepping these objections. That my arguments have
broadly egalitarian distributional implications should only
enhance their appeal.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II investigates rate
regulation and shows that, in the current institutional
environment, the absence of administrative controls on bank
deposit interest rates is a major impediment to the effective
conduct of monetary policy. Unavoidably, this argument
requires a deep dive into the relevant institutional setting-
an area never before explored in the legal literature. I show
that imposing such controls would necessarily involve bank
regulators in what amounts to cost-of-service ratemaking, the
quintessential practice of infrastructure regulation. While
this might initially seem like a big departure from current
practice, in reality bank regulators must already do this type
of valuation in setting deposit insurance fees.
Part III considers entry restriction, which typically goes
hand-in-hand with rate regulation. I have argued in previous
work that restricting entry into (dollar-denominated) "money"
R3QQ] (quoting Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City President Thomas
Hoenig to the effect that large banks are "public utilities"). Noted banking
expert Paul McCulley recently expressed a view that in some ways
resonates with those expressed in this Article. Stephanie Kelton & Paul
McCulley, Opinion, The Fed Chair Should Be a 'Principled Populist', N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/opinion/fed-
chair-yellen-powell.html [https://perma.cc/2KJ7-RKGF] ("Banks are many
things, but at their core, they have a public utility function, access to the
payments system - the highway, if you will, on which you get paid and pay
your bills. In that sense, banks are not different than the gas company or
the electric company, connecting you to the grid[.]").
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creation, on a functional (as opposed to formalistic) basis, is
both feasible and desirable.44 Here I analyze what bank
chartering standards ought to look like in such a system. The
problem turns out to be one of portfolio management: the
monetary authority, like any large endowment manager,
retains external portfolio managers-that is, it outsources.
Understood this way, bank chartering is a procurement
problem, which implies discretionary chartering. Traditional
infrastructure regulation works just this way: prospective
infrastructure providers must obtain certificates of public
convenience and necessity (PCN), granted at regulators'
discretion, before commencing service.
Part IV addresses universal service requirements. The
mainstream payment system is beyond the reach of many
Americans; millions of "unbanked" and "underbanked"
households must rely on expensive alternative providers to
make routine payments. I argue that expanding access to the
mainstream account-money system should be expected to
generate substantial positive spillovers. Imposing universal
service-type obligations on chartered banks to offer
transaction accounts would place banking squarely within the
domain of regulated industries, where such universal service
obligations are standard fare. Concluding thoughts follow.
II. RATE REGULATION AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF MONETARY POLICY
Recent years have witnessed a dramatic transformation in
the Federal Reserve's operational framework for monetary
policy. The new framework has run up against unanticipated
problems. Serious questions have arisen concerning both its
efficacy and its distributional effects. This Part argues that
administrative controls on bank deposit rates present an
attractive (and previously overlooked) strategy for addressing
these problems. Such controls would have the added benefit of
greatly simplifying and rationalizing the institutional
44 See RICKS, supra note 19, at 230-37; Morgan Ricks, Entry
Restriction, Shadow Banking, and the Structure of Monetary Institutions, 2
J. FIN. REG. 291, 294 (2016).
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environment in which monetary policy takes place.
Establishing such controls would be functionally identical to
cost-of-service ratemaking-the most distinctive practice of
traditional infrastructure regulation.
The analysis that follows is rich in institutional detail. This
thick description serves two purposes. First, when it comes to
monetary policy mechanics, the details are all-important, and
knowledge of these details is sparse outside a narrow group of
monetary specialists. Much of this terrain is completely
unknown to the legal literature to date. Indeed, once we get
beyond the bare basics, much of what follows cannot be found
in standard textbooks on macroeconomics and on money and
banking. I aim, then, to provide an up-to-date depiction of
current practice and to make this topic accessible to a
generalist audience. Second, and more importantly, a high-
resolution image of the institutional environment is a
prerequisite to careful critical analysis in this area. We will
see that the institutional setting of monetary policy is
extremely (and needlessly) complex and that this complexity
has been a source of analytical confusion.
A. The Institutional Setting
Modern monetary policy is centrally concerned with
managing short-term interest rates with a view toward
influencing macroeconomic conditions.45 Broadly speaking,
approaches to interest rate control can be classified into two
types: those that rely on reserve scarcity and those that do not.
Prior to late 2008, the Federal Reserve46 made use of reserve
scarcity in its monetary policy implementation framework.
Starting in late 2008, it abandoned the scarce-reserves
approach, relying instead on administered rates to set an
adjustable floor on market interest rates. These two
45 See Federal Reserve Act § 2A, 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012) (codifying the
Federal Reserve's dual mandate of full employment and stable prices).
46 Throughout, this Article uses "Federal Reserve" or the "Fed" as a
catch-all for the U.S. central bank's various organs, including the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the twelve regional Federal
Reserve banks, and the Federal Open Market Committee. These sub-agency
distinctions have no bearing on my argument.
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approaches to interest rate control differ in fundamental
respects. To see how they work, it is first necessary to
understand some key operational features of modern central
banking. This Part therefore begins with a very brief overview
of some rudiments before proceeding to the frontiers of current
practice and debate. Readers familiar with the basics should
proceed directly to Section II.B.
Figure 1 presents a stylized balance sheet of a modern
central bank. Like any balance sheet, it consists of assets (left
side) and claims (right side). Under normal conditions, the
central bank's asset portfolio consists exclusively, or nearly
exclusively, of government securities. It is a safe, liquid,
unexciting portfolio. The right side of the central bank's
balance sheet is what makes it unique. It consists mostly of
base money: outstanding paper currency plus "reserve
balances," which are unconditional promises to deliver paper
currency on demand. While anyone can hold paper currency,
reserve balances may be held only by banks (and select other
governmental or government- sponsored institutions-a
nuance that will become important below).47 Ordinary citizens
and nonbank businesses are not permitted to own reserve
balances. Reserve balances are, in effect, transaction accounts
for commercial banks.48 They are the primary medium
through which banks make payments to one another.
47 In addition to U.S. depository institutions, see 12 U.S.C. § 342 (2012),
the Federal Reserve is authorized to maintain accounts for the U.S.
Treasury, see id. § 391, certain government-sponsored enterprises in the
residential mortgage area, see id. §§ 1435, 1452(d), 1723a(g), foreign
governments, banks, and central banks, see id. §§ 347d, 358, certain
international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank, see 22 U.S.C. § 286d (2012), and certain designated
financial market utilities, see 12 U.S.C. § 5465 (2012), as well as assorted
other governmental and government-sponsored entities omitted here.
48 "Banks use these accounts to make and receive payments in much
the same way that a customer would use his or her checking account at a
commercial bank." FED. RESERVE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES
AND FUNCTIONS 40 (10th ed. 2016).
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Figure 1: Stylized Central Bank Balance Sheet








While base money appears as a "liability" on the central
bank's balance sheet, it is not a liability in any meaningful
economic sense.49 Paper currency holders are not entitled to
any kind of contractual performance from the central bank.
50
Paper currency cannot default in any ordinary legal sense,
because paper currency does not represent any actionable
legal obligation.51 Reserve balances are no different. True,
they are promises to deliver paper currency on demand, but
49 Assume a modern "fiat" money system in which currency lacks
intrinsic value and is not redeemable for anything else.
50 Compare 12 U.S.C. § 411 (2012) (mandating that Federal Reserve
notes "shall be redeemed in lawful money on demand[.]"), with 31 U.S.C. §
5103 (2012) (making Federal Reserve notes legal tender). Here I am echoing
Joseph H. Sommer, Where is a Bank Account?, 57 MD. L. REV. 1, 13 n.30
(1998).
51 In this regard, Federal Reserve liabilities differ from, say, U.S.
Treasury bills. See Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson & Jeremy C. Stein,
The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet as a Financial-Stability Tool, 2016
ECON. POL'Y SYMP. PROC. 335, 338 ("[T]he Fed has a comparative advantage
[over the Treasury Department] in providing very short-term government
liabilities, because as the sole provider of the final means of payment, it does
not face the same kind of 'auction risk' that the Treasury does.").
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this is a "liability" without substance because the central bank
simply prints the paper currency it delivers. The obligation is
therefore trivial-there is no possibility of default. Base
money is unique among financial assets inasmuch as it
imposes no legally cognizable obligation on its issuer.
Central banks typically increase or decrease the quantity
of base money outstanding by buying or selling assets-most
commonly, government securities-in the open market. These
transactions are called "open market operations." When it
buys a security, a central bank pays for it by crediting the
selling bank's reserve balance.52 Base money is thereby
created "out of thin air," by a stroke on a computer keyboard.
This is sometimes loosely called "printing" money, but this is
figurative language; obviously no literal printing is involved
when a reserve balance is credited. The central bank's balance
sheet has grown, and more base money is outstanding. All else
equal, the macroeconomic effect should be stimulative. Open
market purchases put downward pressure on market interest
rates and upward pressure on prices in the economy (i.e., they
are inflationary). This is known as monetary "easing" or
"accommodation."
Open market sales work the other way around. When the
central bank sells a security out of its portfolio, the purchasing
bank pays for it through a reduction in its reserve balance.
The central bank's balance sheet shrinks; it has extinguished
a reserve balance, which means less base money is in
circulation. Open market sales put upward pressure on
market interest rates and downward pressure on prices,
discouraging economic activity at the margin. This is
monetary "tightening" or "contractionary" monetary policy.
52 If the central bank buys the security from a nonbank entity, it credits
the reserve balance of the commercial bank where the seller maintains its
deposit account, whereupon that commercial bank credits the seller's
deposit account. This is the standard practice in the United States; the
Federal Reserve transacts with a designated set of about two dozen
securities firms known as primary dealers. The main text omits this nuance
to simplify the exposition; nothing turns on it here.
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Like any balance sheet, the central bank's balance sheet
has an equity entry on its lower right side. Economically, the
equity belongs to the government as residual claimant.53 The
government receives a revenue stream by virtue of this equity
ownership. Specifically, the central bank earns interest on its
asset portfolio and transfers the interest to the government
after deducting its own expenses (discussed more below). This
payment stream is what central bankers and monetary
economists call "seigniorage"-government revenue from
money creation. The amounts are large. The Fed transferred
$98 billion, $92 billion, and $80 billion in earnings to the
Treasury Department in 2015, 2016, and 2017, respectively.
54
Now, add the chartered banking system to the picture.
Unlike central banks, which issue base money, ordinary
commercial banks must hold reserves of base money to enable
them to meet withdrawals by depositors and other claimants.
Commercial banks hold base money reserves amounting to
only a fraction of their outstanding deposit liabilities. Figure
2 presents a stylized commercial bank balance sheet. Note
that base money is an asset on the commercial bank's balance
sheet whereas it was a liability on the central bank's balance
sheet. The central bank issues base money; commercial banks
hold base money (consisting of reserve balances plus vault
cash) as reserves.
53 In the United States, stock ownership of the twelve regional Federal
Reserve Banks is formally vested in "member banks" of the Federal Reserve
System; however, this stock is inalienable and carries a maximum dividend
of six percent. See Federal Reserve Act § 7(a), 12 U.S.C. § 289(a) (2012). The
U.S. federal government is the de facto residual claimant and receives the
vast majority of the Fed's distributions.
54 See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal
Reserve Board Announces Reserve Bank Income and Expense Data and
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Two additional features of the institutional setting are
important to the analysis below. The first is reserve
requirements (not to be confused with capital requirements55).
Reserve requirements mandate that commercial banks hold
reserves of base money against certain categories of deposit
liabilities-for simplicity, "transaction accounts."56 For
example, under a flat 10% reserve requirement, a bank with
$1 billion in outstanding transaction account liabilities would
be required to hold base money reserves of at least $100
million. This is the amount of "required reserves." Any base
money the bank held in excess of this amount would be "excess
reserves." Reserve requirements are a source of demand for
base money. It follows that, under reserve requirements, the
quantity of reserves in the banking system constrains the
total quantity of transaction accounts outstanding. For
example, if the banking system as a whole has $100 billion in
total reserves and the reserve requirement is set at a flat 10%,
55 Capital requirements obligate banks to maintain equity financing in
proportion to their assets and other (off-balance-sheet) risk exposures. See,
e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 (2018) (capital requirements for national banks).
56 See Federal Reserve Act § 19(b), 12 U.S.C. § 461(b) (2012); 12 C.F.R.
pt. 204 (2018).
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then the banking system's total transaction account liabilities
could be no higher than $1 trillion ($100 billion divided by
10%). If the reserve requirement were 5%, then the same $100
billion in total reserves could support transaction accounts of
up to $2 trillion ($100 billion divided by 5%).
Finally, commercial banks participate in an active lending
market for reserve balances, which in the United States is
called the federal funds market. A federal funds transaction
consists of a short-term (typically overnight) unsecured loan
of reserve balances by one authorized reserve balance holder
to another. The interest rate on such loans-the federal funds
rate-has for decades played a central role in the Federal
Reserve's monetary policy framework.57 Under normal
conditions, the Fed conducts monetary policy by announcing,
and seeking to achieve, a target federal funds rate. The next
two Sections describe the mechanics and execution of this
process.
B. Scarce Reserves
With this institutional setting as a backdrop, we can now
examine the two principal frameworks that modern central
banks use to manage short-term interest rates: reserve
scarcity and administered rates. We begin with reserve
scarcity.
Under scarce-reserves frameworks, reserve requirements
(described above) normally play an important role in
monetary policy.58 Recall that reserve requirements obligate
57 The Federal Reserve has employed a federal funds target rate since
roughly 1984. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-117,
FEDERAL RESERVE: OBSERVATIONS ON REGULATION D AND THE USE OF
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS 49 (2016), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-
117 [https://perma.cc/9GH3-BEBG].
58 Strictly speaking, scarce-reserves frameworks can function with or
without reserve requirements. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and
Sweden have maintained scarce-reserves frameworks without reserve
requirements. See Ulrich Bindseil, Evaluating Monetary Policy Operational
Frameworks, 2016 ECON. POL'Y SYMP. PROC. 179, 185 (2016). Commercial
banks need base money to clear payments, and central banks penalize
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commercial banks to maintain base money reserves in
proportion to their transaction account liabilities. Reserves
are "scarce" when the banking system's total reserves only
slightly exceed required reserves-in other words, when
excess reserves are very small. Commercial banks then have
very little headroom to expand their balance sheets by
increasing transaction account liabilities (an attractive
funding source). Under these conditions, small adjustments to
the base money supply can have a big impact on the federal
funds rate.
Specifically, under reserve scarcity, a modest base money
injection by the central bank-typically accomplished by
purchasing government securities on the open market,
resulting in credits to the selling banks' reserve balances-
will reduce the federal funds rate materially. Other market
interest rates will usually follow, resulting in macroeconomic
stimulus. Conversely, a small base money drainage by the
central bank-typically accomplished by selling portfolio
securities, resulting in debits to the purchasing banks' reserve
balances-will increase the federal funds rate materially.
Other market interest rates tend to follow, and the
macroeconomic effect is contractionary.
In this way, scarce reserves create a powerful fulcrum for
monetary policy transmission. And, by and large, this is how
the Federal Reserve conducted monetary policy until late
2008, when the global financial crisis reached its acute phase.
To see the scarce-reserves approach in action, it is useful to
examine the monetary easing cycle that the Federal Reserve
commenced in September 2007, about a year earlier.
Immediately prior to the easing cycle, the federal funds target
stood at a cyclical peak of 5.25%.59 The banking system's
overdrafts. Demand for reserves therefore exists even without reserve
requirements.
59 The historical federal funds target rate can be found at the Federal
Reserve Economic Database. See Federal Reserve Economic Data ("FRED'),
Federal Funds Target Rate (Discontinued) ('DFEDTAR"), FED. RES. BANK
OF ST. LouIs, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTAR
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required reserves were $40 billion and excess reserves were
only $1.4 billion.60 The Federal Reserve's total assets at the
time were $890 billion.61 The economy was starting to show
signs of weakness in the face of housing market problems and
related financial sector issues. In response, over the ensuing
eight months the Federal Reserve reduced the federal funds
target from 5.25% to 2.00%-a very substantial reduction over
a short period. Because reserves were scarce, the Fed was able
to accomplish this monetary easing via small open market
operations with only trivial changes to its balance sheet. Thus,
in early May of 2008, with the federal funds rate at 2.00%, the
banking system's required reserves were $42 billion and
excess reserves were $2.0 billion. 62 The Federal Reserve's
total assets were still $890 billion. 63 Despite the very large
reduction in the federal funds rate, the Fed's balance sheet
had barely changed.
The Federal Reserve abandoned the scarce-reserves
approach to managing short-term interest rates in late 2008.
It did so because reserves had suddenly become (and remain
today) anything but scarce. In response to the onset of the
acute phase of the crisis in September 2008, the Federal
Reserve extended massive loans to financial institutions to
enable them to meet their liquidity needs. A central bank loan,
like a central bank purchase of securities, expands its balance
sheet: the central bank books a loan receivable (asset) and
simultaneously credits a reserve balance (liability). The
[https://perma.cc/7
VR5-K6J3] (last updated May 4, 2015).
60 FED. RESERVE, STATISTICAL RELEASE: AGGREGATE RESERVES OF
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS AND THE MONETARY BASE H.3 tbl.1 (Sept. 13,
2007).
61 FED. RESERVE, STATISTICAL RELEASE: FACTORS AFFECTING RESERVE
BALANCES OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS AND CONDITION STATEMENT OF
FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS H.4.1 tbl.2 (Sept. 13, 2007).
62 FED. RESERVE, STATISTICAL RELEASE: AGGREGATE RESERVES OF
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS AND THE MONETARY BASE H.3 tbl. 1 (May 8, 2008).
63 FED. RESERVE, STATISTICAL RELEASE: FACTORS AFFECTING RESERVE
BALANCES OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS AND CONDITION STATEMENT OF
FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS, H.4.1 tbl.2 (May 8, 2008).
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reserve balance, created by a stroke on a computer keyboard,
is the borrowed money. As a result of this emergency support
to the financial system, the Fed's balance sheet ballooned
more than twofold in a matter of months, from $909 billion in
early September 2008 to over $2 trillion by year end.64 Excess
reserves in the banking system rose exponentially, from about
$2 billion to about $800 billion.65
Figure 3: Federal Reserve Assets66
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As one might expect, the federal funds rate collapsed.67 In
fact, the Federal Reserve briefly lost control of the federal
funds rate, which began to fall significantly below its target.
In particular, on October 8, 2008, the Fed reduced its federal
funds target rate from 2.00% to 1.50%. The 1.50% target
64 See infra Figure 3.
65 FED. RESERVE, STATISTicAL RELEASE: AGGREGATE RESERVES OF
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS AND THE MONETARY BASE H.3 tbl.1 (Jan. 2, 2009).
66 Federal Reserve Economic Data ("FRED'), FED. RES. BANK OF ST.
Louis, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ [https://perma.ccNV6V7-LJMJT].
"Securities" consists of series WSECOUT; "Liquidity Facilities" consists of
the sum of series WTERAUC, WPC, WSC, WSB, WvPDF, WTERMFAC,
WABCMMF, WCPFF, WLIQSWP, WMAIDEN1, WMAIDEN2,
WMAIDEN3, WALICO, and WAIG; "Other Assets" consists of series
WAICL less the sum of Securities and Liquidity Facilities.
67 See infra Figure 4.
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remained in effect for fifteen business days. The average
effective federal funds rate during those fifteen days was only
0.96%, however, well short of the target. On October 29, the
Fed again lowered its federal funds target, this time to 1.00%.
The new target remained in effect for the next 34 business
days. Yet the average effective federal funds rate during this
period was only 0.33%-again, far short of the target. Finally,
on December 16, the Federal Reserve dropped its federal
funds target rate to a range of 0.00% to 0.25%. It had reached
the so-called zero lower bound; it was now pursuing "zero
interest rate policy," known as ZIRP. This policy would
continue for seven years.
Figure 4: The Federal Funds Rate68
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68 Federal Reserve Economic Data ("FRED"), Effective Federal Funds
Rate ("DFF') (2008), FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis, https://fred.stlouisfed.
org/series/DFF [https://perma.cc/PKT3-Z9J4]; Federal Reserve Economic
Data ("FRED'), Federal Funds Target Range - Lower Limit ("DFEDTARL")
(2008), FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series[DFEDTARL [https://perma.cc/SN8U-
KUZJ]; Federal Reserve Economic Data ("FRED'), Federal Funds Target
Range - Upper Limit ("DFEDTARU") (2008), FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/seriesDFEDTARU [https://perma.cc/
L7QB-ZHL9]; Federal Reserve Economic Data ("FRED'), Federal Funds
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Over the course of 2009, the stress on the financial system
subsided, and the Federal Reserve substantially retracted the
liquidity facilities it had created to combat the crisis.
Nevertheless, the Fed did not allow its balance sheet to shrink
back to a more "normal" size. As shown in Figure 3, reductions
in the Fed's liquidity facilities were offset by vast purchases
of securities-so-called large-scale asset purchases ("LSAPs")
- as part of a policy generally known as quantitative easing
("QE"). These purchases came in three waves, which are
visible in Figure 3. The first wave of LSAPs, known as QEl,
started in early 2009 and ended in March 2010. The second
wave, QE2, lasted from November 2010 to June 2011. The
third and largest wave, QE3, lasted from September 2012 to
October 2014. By the end of QE3, the Fed's balance sheet stood
at about $4.5 trillion, 69 and excess reserves were $2.6
trillion. 70 Far from being scarce, reserves were (and still are)
"superabundant"71: the banking system is "awash in
reserves."72
The LSAPs' stated purpose was to provide extraordinary
monetary stimulus in the face of the worst U.S.
Target Rate (Discontinued) ("DFEDTAR") (2008), FED. RES. BANK OF ST.
LouIs, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTAR [https://perma.cc/56RS-
XM95].
69 FED. RESERVE, STATISTICAL RELEASE: FACTORS AFFECTING RESERVE
BALANCES OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS AND CONDITION STATEMENT OF
FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS H.4.1 tbl.6 (Oct. 30, 2014).
70 FED. RESERVE, STATISTICAL RELEASE: AGGREGATE RESERVES OF
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS AND THE MONETARY BASE H.3 tbl. 1 (Oct. 30, 2014).
71 Jane E. Ihrig, Ellen E. Meade & Gretchen C. Weinbach, Monetary
Policy 101: A Primer on the Fed's Changing Approach to Policy
Implementation 10-11 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No.
2015-047, 2015).
72 Morten L. Bech, Antoine Martin & James McAndrews, Settlement
Liquidity and Monetary Policy Implementation-Lessons from the Financial
Crisis, 18 FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REV. 1, 13 n.21 (2012); see also Ben R. Craig
& Matthew Koepke, Excess Reserves: Oceans of Cash, FRBC ECON.
COMMENT. 1 (Feb. 12, 2015).
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macroeconomic conditions since the Great Depression.73 With
short-term interest rates at or near the zero lower bound,
traditional monetary policy had run out of ammunition.
Whereas traditional monetary easing relies largely on
purchases of short-term government securities, the LSAPs
consisted mostly of longer-maturity bonds. These purchases
were designed to put direct downward pressure on long-term
interest rates.74 In addition, the LSAPs were not limited to
Treasury securities; they included large quantities of
mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by, as well as
securities directly issued by, the housing-finance giants
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. By expanding into these
securities, the Federal Reserve sought to support the flow of
credit to the struggling housing sector while also limiting its
own dominant presence in the Treasury market.
The Federal Reserve's balance sheet was thus
transformed. And this unprecedented expansion raised a
critical question: In a world with superabundant reserves,
how might the Federal Reserve reverse course and raise
interest rates if the economy showed signs of overheating? The
seemingly obvious answer would be to start by reversing the
LSAPs-that is, sell securities. A gradual sell-off of its
enormous securities portfolio should increase long-term
interest rates and dampen inflation. Eventually, the Fed's
balance sheet would renormalize. Reserves would again be
scarce, at which point the Fed could resume its traditional
scarce-reserves approach to managing short-term interest
rates.
73 See, e.g., Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,




74 See Stephen D. Williamson, Quantitative Easing: How Well Does





For better or worse, the Fed has elected not to pursue this
strategy. To be sure, as part of its plans for "policy
normalization," the Fed intends "in the longer run [to] hold no
more securities than necessary to implement monetary policy
efficiently and effectively, and [to] hold primarily Treasury
securities, thereby minimizing the effect of [its] holdings on
the allocation of credit across sectors of the economy."75 But
this balance-sheet shrinkage is to be accomplished "in a
gradual and predictable manner primarily by ceasing to
reinvest repayments of principal on securities" held in its
portfolio.76 In other words, the Fed does not intend to use
LSAP reversal as a means to tighten monetary policy. It has
opted instead to do something else entirely: use administered
rates to support short-term market interest rates.
C. Administered Rates
An administered rate is an interest rate that the central
bank pays on certain of its liabilities and that it can adjust
administratively.77 (The federal funds rate is not an
administered rate but rather a private market rate targeted
by the Fed in the conduct of monetary policy.) The theory is
that these administered rates will "pass through" to other
market interest rates, giving the central bank a way to tighten
or ease monetary policy without necessarily adjusting the
quantity of base money outstanding. Administered rates do
75 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Policy
Normalization Principles and Plans (Sept. 17, 2014),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20l409
17c.htm [https://perma.cc/AVW3-H3FD].
76 Id.; see also Ben S. Bernanke, Shrinking the Fed's Balance Sheet,
BROOKINGS (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.brookings.edublog/ben-
bernanke/2017/01/26/shrinking-the-feds-balance-sheet/
[https://perma.cc/WET2-F84E] ("In short: rate increases first, balance sheet
reduction later.").
77 Technically, there are two types of administered rates: floor rates
and ceiling rates. Because floor rates are much more important than ceiling
rates in the current environment, "administered rates" herein refers only to
floor rates. A ceiling rate is a rate that the central bank charges for loans of
base money, also known as a discount rate.
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not depend on scarce reserves for their efficacy. On the
contrary, I will argue below that they may very well require
the opposite: reserve abundance.
The most important administered rate is the interest rate
the central bank pays on commercial banks' reserve balances.
These interest payments are called "interest on reserves,"
consisting of "interest on required reserves" ("IORR") and
"interest on excess reserves" ("IOER"). IORR and IOER serve
quite different stated purposes. According to the Federal
Reserve, IORR "is intended to eliminate effectively the
implicit tax that reserve requirements . . impose on
depository institutions."78 (This "tax" is discussed further
below.) By contrast, IOER "gives the Federal Reserve an
additional tool for the conduct of monetary policy." 79 Indeed,
IOER has become the central lever for U.S. monetary policy.80
Prior to the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve lacked the
legal authority to pay interest on reserves. All base money was
noninterest-bearing. In October 2008, Congress granted the
Federal Reserve the authority to pay such interest, which it
78 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Interest on Required
Balances and Excess Balances, FED. RES.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reqresbalances.htm
[https://perma.cc/4LDD-E95M] (last updated Sept. 13, 2018); Press Release,
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Board Announces That it Will
Begin to Pay Interest on Depository Institutions' Required and Excess
Reserve Balances (Oct. 6, 2008),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/
monetary20081006a.htm [https://perma.cc/DQ9R-BTN6] ("Paying interest
on required reserve balances should essentially eliminate the opportunity
cost of holding required reserves, promoting efficiency in the banking
sector.").
79 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Interest on Required
Balances and Excess Balances, FED. RES.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reqresbalances.htm
[https://perma.cc/4LDD-E95M] (last update Sept. 13, 2018).
80 See Policy Normalization Principles and Plans, supra note 75
("During normalization, the Federal Reserve intends to move the federal
funds rate into the target range ... primarily by adjusting the interest rate
it pays on excess reserve balances.").
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began doing soon thereafter.S1 When the Fed moved to ZIRP
in December 2008-adopting a federal funds target range of
0.00% to 0.25%-it simultaneously set the IOER rate to
0.25%, the upper end of the range.8 2 The IOER rate remained
there throughout the seven years of ZIRP.83 When the Federal
Reserve finally ended ZIRP (so-called "liftoff') in December
2015-raising the federal funds target to a range of 0.25% to
0.50%-it raised the IOER rate to 0.50%.84 When it again
raised rates in December 2016, this time to a target range of
0.50% to 0.75%, it raised the IOER rate to 0.75%.85 The
pattern has continued: with each subsequent increase in the
federal funds target range (2.00% to 2.25% at this writing8 6),
81 In 2006, Congress authorized the Federal Reserve to begin paying
interest on reserves beginning October 1, 2011. See Financial Services
Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, §§ 201, 203, 120 Stat.
1966, 1968-69 (2006). The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
accelerated the effective date to October 1, 2008. See Pub. L. No. 110-343, §
128, 122 Stat. 3765, 3796 (2008).
82 Federal Reserve Economic Data ("FRED'), Federal Funds Target
Range - Lower Limit ("DFEDTARL") (2008), FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARL [https://perma.cc/6LPG-
SZQW]; Federal Reserve Economic Data ("FRED"), Federal Funds Target
Range - Upper Limit ("DFEDTARU") (2008), FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARU [https://perma.cc/QSD4-
SQRZ]; Federal Reserve Economic Data ('FRED'), Interest Rate on Excess
Reserves ("IOER') (2008), FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IOER [https://perma.cc/U2YY-8URL].
83 Federal Reserve Economic Data ("FRED'), Interest Rate on Excess
Reserves ("IOER') (2015), FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IOER [https://perma.cc/5827-5D6V].
84 Id.
85 Federal Reserve Economic Data ("FRED'), Interest Rate on Excess
Reserves ("IOER') (2016), FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IOER [https://perma.cc/L59E-BYEN].
86 Federal Reserve Economic Data ("FRED'), Federal Funds Target
Range - Lower Limit ("DFEDTARL') (2018), FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFEDTARL [https://perma.cc/88D2-
8CWG]; Federal Reserve Economic Data ("FRED'), Federal Funds Target




the Federal Reserve has set the IOER rate at the top end of
the range.8 7
But why should the IOER rate be set at the top of the
federal funds target range rather than the bottom? One might
have expected (and, in fact, top Fed officials did initially
expect)88 that paying IOER would set an absolute floor on the
federal funds rate-that is, the federal funds rate would never
fall below the IOER rate. After all, why would any bank lend
reserves (unsecured!) to another bank at a lower rate than it
could risklessly earn by simply holding the reserve balance?
In reality, however, the effective federal funds rate has stayed
consistently and significantly below the IOER rate, contrary
to initial expectations.
The generally accepted explanation for this anomaly is
that certain nonbank government-sponsored enterprises
("GSEs")89 are permitted to hold reserve balances but are not
legally eligible to receive interest on those balances.90
87 Federal Reserve Economic Data ("FRED"), Interest Rate on Excess
Reserves ("IOER") (2018), FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series[IOER [https://perma.cc/JSW2- EFTW].
88 See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke & Donald Kohn, The Fed's Interest
Payments to Banks, BROOKINGS (Feb. 16, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2016/02/16/the-feds-
interest-payments-to-banks/ [https://perma.cc/74YX-EERV] (noting that
"many at the Fed expected" the federal funds rate to track the IOER rate);
Simon Potter, Exec. Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Dinner
Address for the Bank of England-Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Conference on Money Markets and Monetary Policy Implementation (Nov.
16, 2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/
2 015/pot
151116 [https://perma.cc/39GR-JK6M] ("[W]e did not anticipate that
frictions in our money markets would limit the arbitrage that would keep
market rates in line with the rate of interest we pay on excess reserves by
such an extent, leaving many money market interest rates well below the
rate of interest paid on excess reserves (IOER), contrary to what theory
would suggest.").
89 Namely, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, together with the federally
chartered Federal Home Loan Banks.
90 See, e.g., Federal Funds and Interest of Reserves, FED. RES. BANK OF
N.Y. (Mar. 2013), https://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed
/fedpoint/fed15.html [https://perma.cc/6UH5-PBZU].
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Consequently, the GSEs are willing to lend their reserve
balances in the federal funds market at rates below the IOER
rate. Still, this alone does not explain why the federal funds
rate would fall materially below the IOER rate. In theory,
commercial banks would compete to borrow the GSEs'
reserves, thereby bidding the federal funds rate up to the
IOER rate. In practice, however, banks have proved unwilling
to do so, and the federal funds rate has remained substantially
below the IOER rate.91 The reason, it seems, is regulation. As
currently implemented, regulatory capital requirements and
deposit insurance fees make balance-sheet expansion costly
for commercial banks. These costs inhibit arbitrage, resulting
in a meaningful spread between the 1OER rate and the federal
funds rate.
In addition to the IOER rate, the Federal Reserve has
established one other important administered rate: the
"overnight reverse repurchase agreement rate," or ON-RRP
rate. A repurchase agreement, or "repo" transaction, consists
of the sale of a security coupled with a forward purchase of the
same security at a slightly higher price.92 A repo transaction
is economically equivalent to a secured borrowing. The "seller"
(borrower) receives cash today and pays it back with interest
on the maturity date. If the seller fails to make the required
payment, the "buyer" (lender) has the security as collateral.
In the Fed's ON-RRP facility, the Fed is the seller/borrower,
and it pays the administered ON-RRP rate to its
counterparties. In substance, this is quite similar to IOER, in
that the Federal Reserve pays interest on certain of its own
liabilities in order to influence market interest rates. But
there is a crucial difference: By law, IOER can be paid only to
commercial banks,93 whereas the Fed can do ON-RRP
transactions with any counterparty it chooses. The Fed
established the ON-RRP facility in September 2013 on a small
91 See infra Figure 5.
92 For a general overview of the repo market, see MARCIA STIGUM &
ANTHONY CRESCENZI, STIGUM'S MONEY MARKET 531-79 (4th ed. 2007).
93 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 461(b)(1)(A), (b)(12) (2012).
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scale; by April 2014 the facility was operating on a large
scale.94
Why are two administered rates (IOER and ON-RRP)
better than one? The Federal Reserve has said that the ON-
RRP facility is designed to help it achieve its target federal
funds rate.95 This is questionable. As noted above, the federal
funds rate can fall below the IOER rate only because the GSEs
are ineligible to receive interest on their reserve balances. If
the ON-RRP facility were intended only to support the federal
funds rate, then it would be supplied exclusively to the GSEs.
Giving the GSEs an overnight, risk-free, interest-bearing
alternative to holding reserve balances would place an
absolute floor under the federal funds rate; the GSEs would
not lend reserve balances in the federal funds market at rates
below the ON-RRP rate. But the Federal Reserve has accepted
into its ON-RRP facility over one hundred counterparties-
including, for example, money market mutual funds-that are
neither commercial banks nor GSEs.96 These institutions are
ineligible to own reserve balances and hence do not participate
in the federal funds market, so it is doubtful that their
inclusion can be justified by reference to the federal funds
rate.
94 See Josh Frost, Lorie Logan, Antoine Martin, Patrick McCabe, Fabio
Natalucci & Julie Remache, Overnight RRP Operations as a Monetary
Policy Tool: Some Design Considerations 10 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series,
Working Paper No. 2015-010, 2015).
95 See, e.g., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Overnight
Reverse Repurchase Agreement Facility, FED. RES.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/overnight-reverse-
repurchase-agreements.htm [https://perma.cc/LR6G-ZY47] (last updated
Jan. 3, 2018) (describing the ON-RRP facility as "a supplementary policy
tool to help control the federal funds rate[.]").
96 For the list of approved ON-RRP counterparties, see Reverse Repo
Counterparties, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/rrp counterparties.html
[https://perma.cc/5JUU-MJ4F].
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Figure 5: Selected Money Market Rates and
Administered Rates97
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Figure 5 hints at a more likely explanation. Rather than
being purely about supporting the federal funds rate, the ON-
RRP facility appears to be designed to support other short-
term market interest rates. As the figure shows, by April 2014
(by which time the facility was operating on a large scale) the
ON-RRP rate appears to have established a very firm floor
under the overnight Treasury tri-party repo rate.9 8 Thus an
alternate explanation for the ON-RRP facility's creation is
97 Federal Reserve Economic Data ("FRED'), Interest Rate on Excess
Reserves ("IOER") (2018), FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LouIs,
https:Hfred. stlouisfed.org/series/IOER [https://perma.cc/S6CF-W83K];
Federal Reserve Economic Data ("FRED'), Effective Federal Funds Rate
("DFF") (2018), FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LouIs,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DFF [https:/Hperma.cc/9RZ9-X2B6]; Bank
of N. Y Mellon Tri-Party Repo Indices, Treasury Repo Index History (2018),
BNY MELLON, https://repoindex.bnymellon.com/repoindex/
[https://perma.cc/5D8N-4NP5]; Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y, Repo and
Reverse Repo Data (2018), FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.,
https://apps.newyorkfed.org/markets/autorates/temp
[https://perma.cc/DW8Y-73D8].
98 The overnight Treasury repo market is a private money market in
which financial institutions borrow money, posting U.S. Treasury securities
as collateral.
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that IOER was not achieving sufficient passthrough from the
federal funds rate to other money market rates (such as tri-
party repo rates). The ON-RRP facility allowed the Fed to
bypass holders of reserve balances and provide administered
rates directly to a broad array of other market participants.
Again, if the exclusive goal had been to support the federal
funds rate, no such bypassing would have been needed: The
Federal Reserve would have supplied the ON-RRP facility to
the GSEs and no one else.
But why isn't IOER alone sufficient to support all money
market rates? It was widely assumed it would be. For
example, in his seminal 2003 tract on monetary policy,
macroeconomist Michael Woodford wrote that "the nominal
interest yield on clearing balances at the central bank can
determine overnight rates in the market as a whole."99 His
reasoning:
[A] central bank [can] determine the interest rate on
overnight deposits at the central bank, and thus the
interest rate in the interbank market for such
claims .... But would control of this interest rate
necessarily have consequences for other market rates,
the ones that matter for critical intertemporal
decisions such as investment spending? The answer is
that it must-and all the more so in a world in which
financial markets have become highly efficient, so that
arbitrage opportunities created by discrepancies
among the yields on different market instruments are
immediately eliminated. Equally riskless short-term
claims issued by the private sector (say, shares in a
money-market mutual fund holding very short-term
Treasury bills) would not be able to promise a different
interest rate than the one available on deposits at the
central bank; otherwise, there would be an excess
supply or demand for the private-sector
instruments. 100
99 MICHAEL WOODFORD, INTEREST AND PRICES: FOUNDATIONS OF A
THEORY OF MONETARY POLICY 35 (2003) (emphasis added).
100 Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added).
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It is now clear that the real world does not work this way, and
it is important to try to understand why.
In a recent paper that has been widely discussed in central
banking circles, Stanford economists Darrell Duffle and
Arvind Krishnamurthy argue that "the current setting of
U.S.-dollar money markets limits the passthrough
effectiveness of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy."lOl
They focus in particular on the role imperfect competition
plays in limiting passthrough. The authors summarize
evidence that bank deposit rates respond asymmetrically to
changes in federal funds rates: When federal funds rates
decline, banks quickly reduce deposit rates, but when federal
funds rates increase, banks are slow to raise deposit rates.
Duffie and Krishnamurthy develop a model in which banks
"exploit the limited attention of their deposit customers" by
failing to fully pass through IOER.102 Importantly, in their
model, "limited passthrough into deposit rates dampens
passthrough into other money market rates, such as those for
T-bills or tri-party repo."1 03 The basic idea is that imperfect
competition in the deposit market suppresses deposit rates,
which pushes more sophisticated cash investors into other
money markets, thereby lowering yields in those markets.104
The paper is highly technical, but Duffie explained the core
takeaway in accessible terms:
When the Fed starts paying more to banks on their
central bank deposits, called reserves, is it actually
the case that T-bill rates move up, repo rates move up,
commercial paper rates move up, bank deposit rates
move up, and so on? If they don't, then those decisions
won't actually get passed through into the broader
economy and have the impact on inflation that the
Fed's looking for.
101 Darrell Duffie & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Passthrough Efficiency in
the Fed's New Monetary Policy Setting 1 (2016) (unpublished manuscript)
(available at https://www.gsb. stanford.edulsites/gsb/files/publication-
pdf/jh-september-8-2016-bw.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5G7-J63Q].
102 Id. at 5.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 23.
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•.. We're in a new regime now. In the old days, the
Fed used to just tighten the screws on banks in terms
of how much reserves they needed to meet their
reserve requirements. But nowadays the Fed is trying
to yank rates up, when it does, by lifting the deposit
rate that it pays to banks [on their] money at the Fed.
That's a completely different monetary policy
framework. What Arvind and I show in our paper is,
yes they can pull rates up, but [there are] some
distortions that are created by things like regulation
and imperfect competition in the banking market. So
what we do is we question how effective they can be.
But definitely they can move rates. [But] it might be
somewhat messy, depending on the monetary policy
framework.
.. [I]t's not just a question of when the Fed moves,
but will the economy respond to the choices that the
Fed makes. And that's a question of how our markets
work.... So we really need to understand how Fed
policy actually affects the economy. That's where the
action is.
... [M]ost of the messiness that I talked about...
won't be apparent until rates are higher. 105
Let me add one other consideration to the mix, which is
that, under administered-rate frameworks, the quantity of the
central bank's interest-paying liabilities in relation to the size
of the broader money markets could turn out to be vital to
monetary policy effectiveness. Some analyses of monetary
policy transmission-including, it seems, the Woodford
excerpt above-tacitly assume that raising administered
rates causes more "funds" to be "stashed" at the central bank
as opposed to "invested" elsewhere, as though the central
bank's balance sheet automatically expanded to "take in"
those funds. This assumption is implicit in the notion that
arbitrage will eliminate rate differentials. But it should be
105 Bloomberg Advantage: Duffie Wonders How Effective Fed Can Be,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.iheart.com/podcast/featured-
podcasts- and-new- show- 21297472/episode/bloomberg- advantage-duffie-
wonders-how-effective-27659505/ [https://perma.cc/RG4Y-27Y9 ].
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evident from the discussion above that the central bank
unilaterally determines the quantity of base money
outstanding. There is no coherent sense in which increasing
administered rates attracts more aggregate "funds" to the
central bank.106 So, even in the absence of frictions, it is
doubtful that administered rates would set an effective floor
under all short-term market rates so long as the short-term
funding markets were very large in relation to the central
bank's interest-paying liabilities.
To be concrete, recall from above that immediately prior to
the financial crisis, excess reserves in the U.S. banking system
hovered around $2 billion.Z07 It is inconceivable that paying
interest on those reserves could possibly have set an effective
floor on rates in the short-term repo market (which then stood
at $4.1 trillion) 108, in the commercial paper market (which
then stood at $2.2 trillion) 109, or, for that matter, in the
market for bank deposits (which then stood at $8.4 trillion).110
Indeed, the Federal Reserve's experience with the ON-RRP
facility has demonstrated that the facility's efficacy varies in
proportion to its size.111 In short, under administered-rate
frameworks, size matters. Ironically, this analysis implies
that as the Federal Reserve gradually shrinks its balance
106 It is true that higher bank deposit rates should, at the margin,
induce currency holders to trade currency for bank deposits, and that banks
could then deliver excess currency to the Fed in exchange for reserve
balances, but this effect is quantitatively insignificant in practice.
107 Federal Reserve Economic Data ("FRED"), Excess Reserves of
Depository Institutions ("EXCRESNS") (2007), FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EXCRESNS [https://perma.cc/6P8F-
2UC4].
108 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Primary Dealer Statistics
(2007), FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/
markets/gsds/search.html [https://perma.cc/LBJ8-4JRZ].
109 Federal Reserve Economic Data ('FRED'), Commercial Paper
Outstanding ("COMPOUT") (2007), FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/COMPOUT [https://perma.cc/U2UJ-
AAW9].
110 See Quarterly Banking Profile, 2 FDIC Q. 1, 5-9 tbls. II-A, I1-A, IV-
A (2008).
111 See Frost et al., supra note 94, at 11-12.
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sheet in pursuit of normalization-a development normally
associated with monetary tightening-its ability to support
market interest rates through administered rates could very
well erode.
Apart from concerns over efficacy, administered-rate
frameworks raise uncomfortable distributional questions. By
their nature, administered rates in the current institutional
setting accrue only to holders of specified central bank
liabilities. In the case of IOER, those holders are commercial
banks. At this writing, commercial banks receive 2.20%
interest 12 on their accounts with the Federal Reserve-a rate
not available to ordinary citizens or nonbank businesses on
their bank accounts. These interest payments come at a fiscal
cost to taxpayers. Recall from above that the central bank
generates seigniorage revenues to the government, consisting
of its portfolio returns less expenses. IOER is an expense, so
interest payments to banks reduce the government's
seigniorage revenues dollar-for-dollar, all else being equal.
It is natural to ask whether administered rates produce a
windfall or subsidy to their recipients at taxpayers' expense.
The question has been controversial. In congressional
hearings in early 2016, Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen
faced pointed questions on this topic from both Democrats and
Republicans. One member of Congress observed that, in 2015,
the Federal Reserve paid about $7 billion in interest to
commercial banks, including more than $100 million to
Goldman Sachs and more than $900 million to JPMorgan
Chase.113 The dollar amounts are likely to be much higher in
112 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Interest on Required
Reserve Balances and Excess Balances, FED. RES.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reqresbalances.htm
[https://perma.cc/6TME-8FPD] (last updated Nov. 28, 2018).
113 See Peter Coy, This Is Why the Fed is Paying Interest to Big Banks,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 10, 2016, 4:57 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-10/this-is-why-the-fed-
is-paying-interest-to-big-banks (on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review); see also John Carney, Treasury's Secretive $2.4 Trillion Mutual
Fund Guarantee, CNBC (Aug. 8, 2012, 5:49 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/id/48578949 [https://perma.cc/W7A2-2QRF]. For a
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the future as rates continue to rise. The Fed has projected
IOER payments totaling $50 billion in 2019.114 Yellen
defended the payments as essential to effective monetary
policy implementation. 115 Soon after the hearing, former chair
Ben Bernanke and former vice chair Don Kohn likewise
defended the payments, arguing that the payments "do not
unduly subsidize banks."116 In support of this claim, they
observed that the difference between the IOER rate and the
federal funds rate had tended to hover around 0.13%.117
Noting that the federal funds rate "is one reasonable measure
of the marginal cost of funds to banks," they concluded that
"the subsidy to banks implicit in the Fed's interest payments
can be no greater than [this 0.13%] difference," which they
took to be quite small.118
The Bernanke-Kohn analysis is unconvincing. Reserve
balances outstanding currently dwarf federal funds
borrowings by a factor of about thirty.119 The dollar amount of
interest payments in the federal funds market is therefore
only a tiny fraction of the dollar amount of IOER payments
over any given period. As passthrough efficiency in the money
markets is limited-arguably owing largely to imperfect
broader discussion of the program, see Kathryn Judge, Guarantor of Last
Resort, 97 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
114 See Erin E. Syron Ferris, Soo Jeong Kim & Bernd Schlusche,
Confidence Interval Projections of the Federal Reserve Balance Sheet and
Income, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS. fig.5 (Jan. 13, 2017),
https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.1875 [https://perma.cc/3WHF-KGR5].
115 See Ann Saphir, Yellen Draws Fire for Fed Policy to Pay Banks,
REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-fed-yellen-
politics/yellen-draws-fire-for-fed-policy-to-pay-banks-idUSL2N 15P1Z7
[https:Hperma.cc/3Q3Q-9VSN].
116 Bernanke & Kohn, supra note 88.
117 See id.
118 Id.
119 Federal Reserve Economic Data ("FRED"), Effective Federal Funds
Volume ("EFFRVOL'), (2018), FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS,
https://fred. stlouisfed.org/series/EFFRVOL [https://perma.cc/5VUR-6HCB];
Federal Reserve Economic Data ("FRED'), Reserve Balances with Federal
Reserve Banks ("WRESBAL'), (2018), FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LoUIS,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WRESBAL [https://perma.cc/T3Y3-37VZ].
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competition-it is impossible to reach any meaningful
conclusions about the existence or size of subsidies by simply
comparing the IOER rate with the federal funds rate;
quantifying subsidies requires analysis of total or average,
rather than marginal, costs of funds.
On top of that, adding the ON-RRP facility might make
matters worse from a distributional standpoint. In the Duffie-
Krishnamurthy model described above, passthrough
efficiency to the broader money markets improves when the
ON-RRP facility is added to IOER.120 However, this result
comes at the expense of reducing passthrough to less
sophisticated depositors. Specifically, sophisticated parties
move out of bank deposits and into higher-yielding money
market alternatives; banks then exploit their market power
over less sophisticated depositors. Perhaps for this reason, the
Federal Reserve has indicated that it intends to use the ON-
RRP facility "only to the extent necessary and will phase it out
when it is no longer needed to help control the federal funds
rate."1
21
How then, should one think about the shift to administered
rates as the central operational tool of monetary policy? Keep
in mind that other tools were and are available. As noted
above, the Fed could tighten by reversing the LSAPs-a
strategy that would require no payments to banks or other
counterparties. Fed officials have expressed some
reservations about this strategy, including concerns that it
might disrupt financial markets.122 But it is far from clear
how serious this risk is. And there is no indication that the
Fed has weighed this risk against the problems with
administered rates, including their questionable efficacy as
well as the distributional concerns just described.
Finally, this discussion has omitted one other possible tool
for monetary tightening: the textbook tool of raising reserve
requirements.123 With a large enough increase in reserve
120 See Duffle & Krishnamurthy, supra note 101.
121 Policy Normalization Principles and Plans, supra note 75, at 1.
122 See, e.g., Bernanke, supra note 76.
123 See, e.g., MISHKIN, supra note 17, at 415.
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requirements, reserves would again be scarce, and the Fed,
could again control the federal funds rate using small open
market operations.l2 4 This strategy, like LSAP reversal,
would involve no payments to banks. Nor would it require
portfolio liquidation. Currently, there are statutory
impediments to ramping up reserve requirements high
enough to make reserves scarce again,125 but recall that there
were statutory impediments to implementing administered
rates until late 2008, when Congress authorized IOER. The
Federal Reserve actively sought IOER authority,12 6 but it has
not yet actively sought greater legal flexibility to raise reserve
requirements. The reluctance to raise reserve requirements
seems to arise, then, not from legal technicalities but from
another source: a deeply ingrained sense that reserve
requirements "tax" banks or that they are somehow
inefficient. As noted above, the elimination of this purported
tax is the stated reason for the Fed's decision to pay interest
on required reserves. 127
This "reserve tax" merits critical scrutiny. In the United
States, banks have a legal monopoly on deposit creation. They
occupy a privileged position in our system of money and
124 See id.
125 See 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012) (limiting reserve
requirements to fourteen percent). But see 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(3) (2012)
(permitting reserve requirements above this amount "[ulpon a finding by at
least 5 members of the [Federal Reserve] Board that extraordinary
circumstances require such action.").
126 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 93RD ANNUAL
REPORT 2006, 139-40 (2006) (explaining the benefits of the Regulatory
Relief Act granting the Federal Reserve Board more authority to pay
interest and more flexibility to set reserve requirements).
127 Recall that IOER and IORR supposedly serve entirely different
purposes: the former is a monetary policy tool, while the latter eliminates a
tax. It seems strange, then, that the two rates are always set at exactly the
same level. The (circular) reasoning seems to be that the supposed tax
consists of the opportunity cost of holding required reserves-and if there
were no reserve requirements, all reserves would receive the IOER rate! But
this is a tautology, not an economic or policy argument.
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payments, one that is a source of significant profits. 28 This
privilege comes with certain obligations, one of which is
reserve requirements. Rather than singling out any one of
these requirements as a "tax," it seems more sensible to see
these various privileges and requirements as components of a
package deal. The next Section takes this package-deal
conception seriously and shows that it opens up a new
perspective on monetary policy implementation.
D. An Infrastructure Perspective
As discussed in supra Part I, the institutional baseline in
the money paradigm is direct government provisioning of
"account money," just as the U.S. government currently
supplies paper money as a monopolist. Commercial banks'
monetary function is then understood as an outsourcing or
franchise arrangement.
To trace the implications of this framework, it is useful to
first envision an institutional setup in which everyone holds
his or her transaction account directly with the central bank,
and no private firms offer (dollar-denominated) account
money or close substitutes therefor. In this insourced setting,
the administered rate-the rate the central bank pays on its
liabilities-accrues to every holder of account money. There is
no question of passthrough here because there is no
commercial banking system through which the central bank
seeks to pass interest.129
128 This point is sometimes expressed by noting that banks earn what
amounts to seigniorage. See, e.g., CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN,
CURRENCY, AND THE COMING OF CAPITALISM 414-21 (2014) (discussing
private "seigniorage"); Bindseil, supra note 58, at 190 (referring to
"'seigniorage' income of banks"); Frank D. Graham, Partial Reserve Money
and the 100 Per Cent Proposal, 26 AM. ECON. REV. 428, 430 (1936) (noting
that banks earn "seigniorage profits"); Robin Greenwood, Samuel G.
Hanson & Jeremy C. Stein, A Comparative-Advantage Approach to
Government Debt Maturity, 70 J. FIN. 1683, 1705 (2015) (referring to the
value derived from issuing money-like instruments as "seigniorage").
129 The administered rate serves as an absolute floor on short-term
market interest rates. Everyone's transaction account is nondefaultable in
the same sense that paper money is nondefaultable.
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Two things about this insourced system are salient for this
discussion. First, all profit from money creation-the
difference between the central bank's portfolio earnings and
its expenses (assumed to consist mostly of interest paid on
accounts)-accrues to the government as seigniorage. This
might very well be a substantial source of government
revenue. Second, changes in the administered rate affect this
revenue stream, just as they affect seigniorage revenue today.
All else being equal, increasing administered rates reduces
seigniorage, as each dollar of interest paid is one dollar less of
government revenue from money creation.
Now suppose the government elects to outsource (never
mind why)130 by establishing chartered banks whose equity is
privately owned. Can administered deposit rates, determined
as a matter of monetary policy, be sustained? That is, can the
monetary authority retain control over the interest paid on
account money? There is no reason in principle why it cannot.
Demsetz's franchise bidding framework is instructive here.131
Bank charters afford the valuable privilege of issuing account
money ("deposits"), an especially cheap source of funding.132
In a competitive auction, entrepreneurs would bid up the price
of bank charters until they were just indifferent to having one.
This price could consist of a lump-sum payment to the
government (as in an auction of broadcast spectrum), but it
would more likely involve a stream of payments in which the
winning bidders would agree to pay the government each
period the difference between their "fair" cost of financing-
the cost of financing they would incur if they replaced their
deposit funding with debt financing in the longer-term private
capital markets-and their actual cost of deposit funding.
From the government's standpoint, this payment stream
would be a form of seigniorage revenue.
130 See infra notes 194-204 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
132 Gary Gorton, Bank Regulation When 'Banks'and 'Banking'Are Not
the Same, 10 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL. 106, 107-08 (1994) (discussing the
"charter value" of banks); cf. Jeremy C. Stein, Monetary Policy as Financial
Stability Regulation, 127 Q.J. ECON. 57, 63 (2012) (noting the low pecuniary
yield of money-like claims).
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In this structure, bank stockholders are completely
indifferent to government-administered bank deposit rates.
Banks pay the fair cost of financing no matter what; how these
payments are divvied up between account holders and the
government is irrelevant to the banks. The monetary
authority retains the power to determine bank account rates
in the conduct of monetary policy. Raising deposit rates
reduces seigniorage revenue in the fully insourced system-
just as with administered rates in today's framework, as
shown above. When the government insources, it receives all
the revenue generated by money creation. When it outsources,
it presumably should give up no more revenue than necessary
to induce the desired private sector participation. The decision
to outsource in no way implies that the government must
forfeit the entirety of the associated seigniorage revenue
stream.
This structure would involve the monetary authority in a
difficult valuation task: determining a "fair" cost of financing
for each bank. No doubt this is challenging, but it raises two
points that are germane to this Article's broader argument.
First, U.S. bank regulators are already engaged in this
valuation exercise. They have been doing it for a quarter
century, albeit in a somewhat crude way. Since 1991, deposit
insurance fees that banks pay to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") have been risk-based, or
keyed to the risk of the bank's insolvency.133 In principle, risk-
based fees impose a fair price for the risk underwritten by the
deposit insurer, which is the risk that the bank's assets may
become insufficient to cover its insured liabilities. If bank
regulators price fees correctly, the deposit insurer expects to
133 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
(FDICIA) of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 302(a)-(b), 105 Stat. 2236, 2345-
49 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (2012)). Prior to that time,
deposit insurance fees were one size fits all-they were not scaled to the risk
of the institution. Evidence from the stock market suggests that the
introduction of risk-based fees penalized risky banks and rewarded safer
banks-exactly the desired incentive effect. See Marcia M. Cornett, Hamid
Mehran & Hassan Tehranian, The Impact of Risk-Based Premiums on
FDIC-Insured Institutions, 2 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 153, 154-55 (1998).
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break even over time: incoming fees match payouts. The
structure of U.S. deposit insurance reflects this expectation;
fees accrue to the deposit insurance fund and are not a source
of government revenue.
To formalize slightly, any firm's debt financing cost can be
expressed as Rf + P, where Rf is the risk-free rate
corresponding to the debt's duration and P is a risk premium.
Well-priced deposit insurance fees correspond to p.134 Recall
that, in the outsourcing scenario described above, the
government seeks to charge each bank the difference between
its fair cost of long-term debt financing and its actual cost of
deposit funding. This payment equates to Rf + P - D, where D
is the administered deposit rate. Rf is observable (the U.S.
Treasury yield corresponding to the bank's asset portfolio
duration) and D is determined administratively, so the
valuation exercise consists of estimating P. This is isomorphic
to deposit insurance. The only difference is that the
government now receives expected net revenue of Rf - D.135
This amounts to seigniorage; it is value that would be
expected to accrue to the government in the hypothetical
Demsetz auction (equivalently, it is value that would accrue
to the government in the fully insourced system).
Second, this type of valuation exercise is the central,
archetypal practice of infrastructure regulation.
Infrastructure ratemaking asks regulatory commissions to set
regulated firms' product rates with a view toward generating
a fair rate of return on invested capital.136 "Specify[ing] the
rate of return . . . occupies much of the agenda of modern
134 Economically, this fee can be represented as the premium on a put
option written on the bank's portfolio, struck at the face value of the bank's
insured deposits. See Robert C. Merton, An Analytic Derivation of the Cost
of Deposit Insurance and Loan Guarantees: An Application of Modern
Option Pricing Theory, 1 J. BANKING & FIN. 3, 4 (1977).
135 If P is priced correctly, it is exactly offset by expected losses over
time.
136 See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 36-59 (1982);
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A
NUTSHELL 94-98 (1999).
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commissions[,]" notes now-Justice Stephen Breyer.137 The
exercise is precisely equivalent to estimating P above. The
goal in each case is to set a rate of return commensurate with
risk. As with deposit insurance, the methods are inexact, but
perfection is not the relevant standard. "[S]etting a rate of
return cannot-even in principle-be reduced to an exact
science," Breyer observes.138 "To spend hours of hearing time
considering elaborate rate-of-return models is of doubtful
value, and suggestions of a proper rate, carried out to several
decimal places, give an air of precision that must be false."1
39
The symmetry between banking-as-monetary-outsourcing
and infrastructure ratemaking becomes even clearer when it
is recognized that the two systems give rise to identical
incentive problems on the part of regulated firms. With
monetary outsourcing, bank equity owners and management
can profit by ramping up portfolio risk and/or increasing
leverage. This moral hazard incentive-a product of
asymmetric information between bank management and
regulators-is universally regarded as the central problem of
deposit insurance.140 Notably, infrastructure regulators face
analogous problems. If allowed rates of return are too high,
regulated firms have an incentive to overinvest, expanding
the rate base ("gold plating").141 And when firms are assured
of being compensated for actual costs of production, their
incentives to keep costs down are muted. "[T]he regulated firm
may use its information advantage (asymmetric information)
strategically to exploit the regulatory process to increase its
137 BREYER, supra note 136, at 40.
138 Id. at 47.
139 Id.; cf. Fischer Black, Merton H. Miller & Richard A. Posner, An
Approach to the Regulation of Bank Holding Companies, 51 J. Bus. 379, 387
(1978) (defending risk-based deposit insurance fees and noting that "any
system of estimating risk will have arbitrary elements in it.").
140 CARNELL ETAL., supra note 4, at 223.
141 This is the so-called Averch-Johnson (AJ) effect. See Harvey Averch
& Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint,
52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1068 (1962).
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profits .... This creates a potential moral hazard," notes one
expert. 142
On top of that, bank regulation and infrastructure
regulation employ similar techniques to deal with these moral
hazard incentives. Among other things, bank regulators
impose prudential portfolio constraints to limit risk-taking;
they prohibit insured banks from owning stock and junk
bonds, for example.143 Analogously, public utility regulators
disallow investments that are not "prudently incurred" from
inclusion in the rate base.144 Operating costs may also be
disallowed. 145 These tools mitigate the effects of moral hazard,
albeit imperfectly.
To summarize, nothing about monetary outsourcing
implies that monetary authorities must relinquish control
over account-money rates. On the contrary, the money
paradigm naturally implies a system in which such control is
not relinquished. When it comes to monetary policy
implementation, this approach has obvious advantages over
the present system of administered central bank rates. The
current system presents serious passthrough problems. The
Federal Reserve today seeks to influence market rates by
adjusting the interest rate on its own liabilities, but the effect
turns out to be muted. The ON-RRP facility is designed, in
part, to deal with this issue, but it raises problems of its own
and adds complexity and opacity to an already immensely
complicated and opaque system. Moreover, the current
approach raises distributional concerns, as administered
rates accrue only to a privileged set of institutions.
Establishing regulatory controls over bank deposit interest
rates would render these problems moot. Passthrough issues
would evaporate, as the administered rate would accrue to all
holders of account money. No set of institutions would have
privileged access to administered rates. And monetary policy
142 Paul L. Joskow, Incentive Regulation and its Application to
Electricity Networks, 7 REV. NETWORK ECON. 547, 550-51 (2008).
143 See 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (2012) (stocks); 12 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2018)
(junk bonds).
144 See Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 37, at 4-8.
145 Id. at 8.
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efficacy would no longer require a large central bank balance
sheet.
In this regulatory model, it would be pointless to refer to
any particular regulatory constraint as a "tax" for which
chartered banks must then somehow be compensated. If, in
the hypothetical franchise auction described above, the
government indicated that the IORR rate would be held
permanently at zero percent (as was the case in the United
States before late 2008), then bidders would simply price this
term into their bids. From a practical regulatory standpoint,
the relevant binding constraint is that the provisions of the
regulatory package as a whole must produce a rate of return
sufficient to attract capital to the enterprise. This is well-
understood in infrastructure regulation. To quote the leading
Supreme Court case on public utility ratemaking, allowed
returns "should be sufficient ... to attract capital."1 4 6 Returns
in excess of this amount constitute rent extraction.
To be sure, re-establishing regulatory controls over bank
deposit rates would present administrative challenges,
particularly with respect to valuation. But these valuation
challenges are already inherent in deposit insurance pricing,
which is central to existing bank regulation. It is far from
obvious that the incremental costs of implementing
administrative controls over bank deposit rates would exceed
the very considerable benefits described above. And there is a
longstanding, well-established regulatory model for this form
of ratemaking in the area of infrastructure regulation.
Stepping back, it is evident that this monetary-outsourcing
regulatory model, which emerges logically from the money
paradigm, is fundamentally inconsistent with the
intermediation paradigm. Intrinsic to the very notion of
intermediation is that claims on the enterprise should reflect
the risk attributes of the left side of the balance sheet (the
asset portfolio). In the intermediation paradigm, decoupling
these things cannot be seriously entertained. Taking the
money paradigm seriously thus reveals institutional
alternatives that are otherwise obscured from view. It raises
146 Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
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the prospect of a rationalized and simplified approach to
monetary policy implementation, one that is more
transparent, more efficient, and more equitable.
III. ENTRY RESTRICTION AND THE OPTIMAL
NUMBER OF BANKS
Deposit interest rate controls were a conspicuous feature
of the New Deal system of bank regulation.147 Known as
Regulation Q, these controls unraveled in the 1980s. The
proximate cause of their unraveling was banking system
disintermediation. The banking industry had lobbied in favor
of these controls in the 1930s with a view toward raising bank
profits by lowering costs.148 What the industry did not foresee
was the emergence of deposit substitutes. High interest rates
in the 1970s and early 1980s gave rise to the money market
mutual fund ("MMF") industry. MMFs mimicked key features
of deposit accounts but paid higher interest rates. When bank
depositors started flocking to MMFs, Regulation Q could no
longer be sustained.14 9
Regulation Q's demise points to a central issue in rate
regulation more generally. Whenever prices are set "high" for
some or all users,150 unregulated firms may seek to undercut
rate regulation by offering substitute products at lower prices.
To avoid this, rate regulation usually goes hand-in-hand with
147 See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 11, 48 Stat. 162, 181-
82 (1933).
148 See, e.g., Robert C. West, The Depository Institutions Deregulation
Act of 1980: A Historical Perspective, FED. RES. BANK OF KAN. CITY ECON.
REV., Feb. 1982, at 5.
149 See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 201-210, 94 Stat. 132, 142-45 (1980); see
also The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 627, 124 Stat. 1376, 1640 (2010).
150 Low deposit interest rates are "expensive" from the consumer's
perspective.
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entry restriction.151 Traditional infrastructure regulation
implements entry restriction by requiring prospective
infrastructure providers to obtain certificates of public
convenience and necessity, granted at regulators' discretion.
Banking regulation, too, employs entry restriction, though its
history has been rocky, as explored in more detail below.
152
Plainly, the system of rate regulation described in Part II
would require effective entry restriction into (dollar-
denominated) "money" creation. There are two dimensions to
this issue. First, one must define with specificity the nature of
the activity into which entry is to be restricted. Second, one
must establish criteria and processes for authorizing entry.
Part III shows that the intermediation paradigm has left us
ill-equipped to think coherently about these twin topics. The
result has been conceptual and legal confusion. By contrast,
reembracing the money paradigm-which sees bank money
creation through a procurement lens-offers a natural way to
structure how we think about entry. Among other things, the
analysis that follows will offer a novel perspective on the
optimal number of chartered banks.
A. Regulatory "Arbitrage" and the Money Substitute
Problem
The first and most basic task of banking law is to define
the legal privilege that a banking charter conveys. In current
U.S. law, it is axiomatic that only banks (authorized
depository institutions) may incur "deposit" liabilities.153 But
151 In particular, entry restriction is typically used to prevent "cream
skimming" in the presence of cross subsidies. These issues are discussed
infra Part IV.
152 See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
153 See 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(2) (2012). This provision of federal law is
supplemented and reinforced by state "unauthorized banking" statutes. See,
e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 131 (McKinney 2018). Such laws have been in
effect, in one form or another, since the early nineteenth century. See, e.g.,
Act of Apr. 21, 1818, ch. 236, 1818 N.Y. Laws 242 (prohibiting unauthorized
persons from conducting banking business or operations).
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this only restates the question in a different guise: what then
is a deposit?
Among the oddities of banking law is that this question-
the foundational question of the field-gets virtually no legal
or scholarly attention.154 "Deposit" is not defined in the entry
restriction provision in federal law. To appreciate how strange
this is, compare other subfields of financial regulation.155 In
securities regulation, the starting point is, and must be, "what
is a security?" Federal statutory law defines the term,156 and
cases interpreting the definition are part of the regulatory
canon.157 The same goes for investment company regulation:
there is a statutory definition58 and a subsequent body of
interpretive case law,159 together with critical scholarship.l60
In insurance regulation, defining "insurance" is among the
most basic tasks.161 To regulate swaps, the law must define a
154 An important exception is Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV.
237 (1992). For a practitioner's perspective, see Peter S. Smedresman, Bank
Deposits - A Troublesome Evolution, 35 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 50, 50 (July 2016)
("The privilege of accepting deposits from the public is the exclusive
franchise of the commercial banking sector, under authority granted by
bank regulators .... There is remarkably little law, however, that helps to
clearly distinguish a deposit from other debt obligations, of a bank or
otherwise.").
155 See Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial
Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 367-71
(1999).
156 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).
157 See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
158 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (2012).
159 See, e.g., SEC v. Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc., 486 F.3d 305 (7th Cir.
2007).
160 See, e.g., Edmund H. Kerr, The Inadvertent Investment Company:
Section 3(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act, 12 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1959).
161 See TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 622
(4th ed. 2017) ("Whatever the content of insurance regulation, there is a
need to determine the range of economic activity to which that regulation
applies.... [T]he definition of the term 'insurance' is central to determining
the jurisdiction of state 'insurance' departments.").
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swap.162 To regulate proprietary trading, the law must define
proprietary trading. 163 This list could continue indefinitely. In
each of these regulatory fields, the inescapable starting point
is to define in functional terms what is to be regulated. For
whatever reason, there has been no comparable endeavor in
the law of "deposit" claims.
True, federal statutory law does define "deposit" for
purposes of deposit insurance (as distinct from entry
restriction). Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act("FDIA"), a "deposit" is "money or its equivalent received or
held by a bank... for which it has given or is obligated to give
credit . . . to . . . [an] account[.]"16 4 As a matter of statutory
construction, few would object to importing this definition into
the entry restriction section, where "deposit" is left undefined.
But would this help at all? Note, first, a basic confusion
within the FDIA's definition: it defines "deposit" in terms of
what the bank received instead of the characteristics of the
deposit claim itself. No one would fathom defining "security"
in terms of what the issuer received. Whether a share of stock
is issued in exchange for cash or noncash consideration (labor,
tangible or intangible assets, other securities, whatever)
obviously has no bearing on whether it is a share of stock. A
deposit balance, like a share of stock, is a claim on an entity,
and it seems self-evident that the same principle should apply.
To be concrete, if a deposit balance is credited in exchange for
a loan receivable-the usual and customary way banks make
loans-presumably the claim is still a "deposit" even though
"money or its equivalent" wasn't "received" by the bank. In
short, it is hard to conceive of any reason why the asset an
entity receives (or accepts or takes) in exchange for incurring
a liability should determine the legal substance of the liability
itself. Courts have proved susceptible to this confusion. When
called upon to interpret the FDIA's "deposit" definition, the
162 See 7 U.S.C. § la(47) (2012).
163 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§ 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4) (2012).
164 12 U.S.C. § 1813(1) (2012).
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Supreme Court concerned itself almost exclusively with what
exactly the bank "received."165
Even if courts and regulators overcame this bit of
confusion, the FDIA's "deposit" definition would still offer no
practical way forward for entry restriction. The essence of
entry restriction is that only authorized banks may incur
"deposit" obligations. But the FDIA defines "deposit" as an
obligation of a bank. So this is a perfect legal circle.
This lack of a functional definition is not a benign
oversight. When the MMF industry arose in the late 1970s,
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") was faced
with the question of whether claims on MMFs were "deposits"
and thus whether MMFs were engaged in unauthorized
banking. The SEC asked the Department of Justice (the
"DOJ") for a legal opinion on the matter. The DOJ's reply was
a masterpiece of legal formalism. Heedless of economic
substance, it opined in essence that MMF shares are not
deposits because they are equity not debt.166 Seemingly lost
on the DOJ was the fact that MMFs arose precisely to mimic
bank deposits. MMFs would later prove just as unstable as
uninsured bank deposits. At the peak of the 2008 financial
crisis, prime institutional money funds suffered a massive
run, prompting the U.S. government's single largest rescue
commitment of the crisis (over $2 trillion). 167
165 FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426 (1986). In particular,
the Court deemed the pertinent question to be whether "assets and 'hard
earnings had been "entrusted" to the bank or had been "surrender[ed] to
the . . . custody" of the bank or were in the "possession" of the bank.
"Congress wanted to ensure that someone who put tangible assets into a
bank could always get those assets back," the Court wrote. Id. at 435. The
Court thus seemed to see a deposit as a form of bailment.
166 See Letter from Philip B. Heymann & Lawrence Lippe, Crim. Div.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Martin Lybecker, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Mktg. Mgmt.,
SEC (Dec. 18, 1979) (on file with author).
167 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces
Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 29, 2008),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp 1161.aspx
[https://perma.cc/5VQR-NE2W].
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I have argued elsewhere that the failure to reach a
functional legal specification of what constitutes a monetary
instrument has been the central issue of bank regulatory
history.168 The details need not be covered here, but a few
brief highlights are instructive. Soon after the founding of the
Bank of England in 1694, Parliament forbade any other entity
in England (apart from small partnerships) from issuing "bills
or notes payable at demand or at any less time than six
months" from issuance.169 The law took aim at bank notes, but
Parliament failed to see that deposit accounts were
economically the same thing. Later, deposits would come to
dwarf bank notes in circulation in England, rendering the
prohibition ineffectual. 170
Amazingly, this pattern repeated itself in the United
States. The National Bank Acts of 1863 and 1864 created a
new class of federally chartered "national" banks that were
authorized to issue a new form of paper money (national bank
notes).171 With this system, Congress sought to federalize
money creation: it aimed to supplant, rather than supplement,
money creation by state-chartered banks. Fatefully, though,
Congress opted to drive state banks out of existence by
imposing a prohibitive tax on bank notes issued by entities
other than federally chartered banks.172 Famously, state
banks responded by changing the form of their monetary
liabilities: they shifted from bank notes to checkable deposits.
As in England, restricting entry into money creation failed,
owing to an arbitrary formalism. Not until the turn of the
twentieth century was there widespread recognition that
168 RICKS, supra note 19, at 230-37; Ricks, supra note 44.
169 Bank of England Act 1708, 7 Ann. c. 30, § 66 (Eng.).
170 See ERNEST SYKES, BANKING AND CURRENCY 95-96 (1905).
171 National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, §§ 5, 8, 22, 13 Stat. 99, 100-01,
105-06 (superseding the National Currency Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat.
665).
172 See Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78, § 6, 13 Stat. 469, 484, amended by
Act of February 8, 1875, ch. 36, § 19, 18 Stat. 307, 311.
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deposit liabilities might pose more or less the same policy
problem as bank notes.173
The MMF episode of the 1970s, then, was just another
installment in a centuries-old historical pattern. And it did
not stop there. In the late twentieth century, a large deposit-
substitute ecosystem, consisting of various types of financial
sector short-term debt, arose alongside MMFs. In the early
years of the twenty-first century, this "shadow deposit"
system assumed gigantic proportions.174 Instruments such as
repurchase ("repo") agreements, asset-backed commercial
paper, Eurodollars, and auction-rate securities came to serve
as institutional alternatives to bank deposits. These short-
term debt instruments are classified as "cash equivalents" for
accounting purposes.175 The accounting treatment reflects a
deeper economic reality. Because they have very stable values
in nominal terms, these instruments are effective substitutes
for money; they satiate money demand. It is increasingly
recognized that their issuance amounts to money creation
outside the regular money-and-banking system.176 The
unraveling of these cash equivalent markets was central to
the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the ensuing Great
Recession.
If we are going to allow deposit substitutes to be freely
issued, why bother requiring a special charter to issue
"deposit" debt? What work is banking law supposed to be
doing? Maybe the whole concept of banking law is outmoded.
After all, a singular feature of the intermediation paradigm is
its insistence on downplaying, or denying altogether, the
specialness of "money"-type claims and their issuers. James
Tobin, to take a prominent example, sought explicitly to "blur
the sharp traditional distinctions between money and other
173 See GEORGE E. BARNETT, STATE BANKS AND TRUST COMPANIES SINCE
THE PASSAGE OF THE NATIONAL-BANK ACT, S. Doc. No. 61-659, at 11-12 (3d
Sess. 1911).
174 See RICKS, supra note 19, at 32-37.
175 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 95: STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS (1987).
176 See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
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assets and between commercial banks and other financial
intermediaries."177 Money and its creation are nothing special
in this view. Modern legislators and regulators have taken
this conceptual "blurring" to heart. Among the key
innovations of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 were mechanisms to extend
bank-type regulation, supervision,78  and insolvency
proceedings179 beyond the banking system proper. Modern
approaches to so-called "macroprudential" supervision of the
financial system reflect a similar sentiment.
80
The money paradigm turns this logic on its head. If money
creation is an intrinsically public activity-and if private
encroachment into money creation implicates sensitive issues
of systemic stability, macroeconomic management, and
private capture of seigniorage-then it almost goes without
saying that money creation needs to be confined to the
government itself and its designated franchisees. On this
view, entry restriction is indispensable; it is implicit in the
whole concept of outsourcing or procurement. Historically, as
we have seen, bank regulation sought to do precisely this,
albeit formalistically.
The system of rate regulation described in Part II would
require doing entry restriction along functional lines. In other
177 Tobin, supra note 16, at 410.
178 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§§ 111-123, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321-5333 (2012); see also Daniel K. Tarullo,
Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the
Americans for Financial Reform and Economic Policy Institute Conference,
Shadow Banking and Systemic Risk Regulation (Nov. 22, 2013) ("The
process established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act for designation of systemically important non-bank firms has
provided a means for ensuring that the perimeter of prudential regulation
can be extended as appropriate to cover large shadow banking
institutions.").
179 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§§ 201-217, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-5394 (2012).
180 See, e.g., Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the National Association
for Business Economics, Macroprudential Supervision and Monetary Policy
in the Post-crisis World (Oct. 11, 2010).
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words, U.S. banking law's current prohibition on incurring
"deposit" liabilities without a bank charter would need to be
modernized to suppress issuances of cash equivalents by
nonbank financial institutions. I have argued elsewhere that
such an update is both feasible and desirable.'S1 This brings
us to the second prong of the entry restriction analysis: Once
entry into money creation has been restricted, who gets to
enter?
B. The Bipolar History of U.S. Bank Chartering
Standards
Confining money creation to licensed banks is only half the
story of entry restriction. For how does one go about getting a
banking license? If banking licenses were handed out freely
and indiscriminately, entry restriction would be
inconsequential.
The history of bank chartering standards in the United
States is one of continual vacillation. In the early republic,
state legislatures granted bank charters and other corporate
charters on an ad hoc basis. The process smacked of cronyism
and special privilege.18 2 Starting in the 1810s, states began
liberalizing their corporation laws, allowing all citizens equal
access to the corporate form through a routinized
administrative process. These "general incorporation"
statutes did not, however, grant free access to bank charters.
Banking was perceived as a sensitive activity, and a special
act by the legislature remained the exclusive route to bank
chartering.
But the same egalitarian sensibility that led to general
incorporation statutes would soon take aim at banking.
Starting in the late 1830s, states began enacting so-called
181 See RICKS, supra note 19, at 230-43.
182 See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND
CASES ON THE LAW OF BuSINESS ORGANIZATION 78-82 (5th ed. 2016)
(describing a historical trend from incorporation through special acts by
state legislatures toward general acts of incorporation).
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"free banking" statutes.18 3 It is sometimes incorrectly
assumed that "free banking" meant no bank regulation at all.
In fact, free banking statutes imposed strict limits on bank
activities and portfolios. "Free banking" meant free entry into
banking. State officials would grant a banking charter to
anyone meeting the requisite statutory standards.
The National Bank Act, enacted in 1863 and 1864,184
marked the beginning of federal bank regulation in the United
States.185 Patterned after the free banking statutes, the
National Bank Act on its face accorded the comptroller no
discretion in granting national bank charters. It said simply
that the comptroller "shall give" a charter to qualified
applicants. 186 Nonetheless, the earliest comptrollers exercised
discretion. They reviewed information on economic conditions
and existing banks in the locality when passing on bank
charter applications.187 This policy was reversed in the 1870s
under the comptrollership of John Knox, who did not believe
he had discretionary power under the Act.188 After the Panic
of 1907, however, the comptroller's office waffled back to
discretion, owing to concerns about "over-banking."
18 9
Discretionary national bank chartering received a
somewhat firmer statutory foundation with the Banking Act
of 1935,190 enacted after waves of bank panics had amplified
the Great Depression. The 1935 Act required the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") to certify that, in
183 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 18, 1838, ch. 260, 1838 N.Y. Laws 245-46
(authorizing the business of banking). The political history of this Act is
discussed in Bray Hammond, Free Banks and Corporations: The New York
Free Banking Act of 1838, 44 J. POL. ECON. 184 (1936).
184 See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
185 I am disregarding the ill-fated first and second Banks of the United
States, which were not designed to implement broad-based banking
regulation (though they did end up playing a quasi-regulatory role).
186 National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, § 18, 13 Stat. 99, 104-05 (1864).
187 MICHAEL S. BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR,
FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 162 (2016).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 163.
190 See Bank Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, 49 Stat. 684.
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chartering a new bank, "consideration ha[d] been given" to the
factors that the FDIC was required to consider when
evaluating deposit insurance applications.191 By far the most
important factor was the "convenience and needs of the
community to be served by the bank."192 A decade later, when
the OCC formalized its chartering standards by rulemaking,
it adopted the six statutory factors as a basis for passing on
charter applications.193
In adopting the "convenience and needs" factor for national
bank chartering, Congress and the OCC took a page from
infrastructure regulation. Half a century earlier, states had
begun requiring prospective infrastructure providers to obtain
certificates of "public convenience and necessity" ("PCN"
certificates) before commencing service.194 As some analysts
have pointed out, the term "licensing" is too generic to capture
this regulatory allocation function.195 Licensing systems
typically admit all applicants that meet the requisite
standards; such systems may be used to weed out unfit
providers, for example. The PCN certificate is different, in
that otherwise qualified applicants may be excluded because
the agency feels additional providers are unnecessary.96 This
is the nature of procurement. By 1910, railroads, telegraph
191 Id. at 687.
192 Id. at 688.
193 Organization of Bureau of the Comptroller of the Currency, 11 Fed.
Reg. 177A-13, 177A-14 (Sept. 11, 1946) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. ch. 1).
Subsequent case law confirmed the OCC's broad discretion to reject charter
applications based on the six statutory factors, including the "convenience
and needs" factor. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973). For a
thorough, highly critical analysis of federal banking agencies' chartering
decisions from the New Deal to the early 1970s, see Kenneth E. Scott, In
Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions of the Federal Banking Agencies,
42 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1975).
194 William K. Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity: Developments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
426, 426 (1979).
195 See BREYER, supra note 136, at 71; Jones, supra note 194, at 427.
196 See BREYER, supra note 136, at 194; PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note
136, at 256, 278.
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and telephone services, and gas, electric, and water utilities
were subjected to PCN certificate requirements in most
states. 197  Congress later elevated PCN certificate
requirements to the federal level, starting with railroads in
1920,198 followed by other transportation industries
199 and
the telecommunications industry during the New Deal.
200 By
inserting this requirement into federal banking law in 1935,
Congress affirmed the commonality between banking and
other network-type industries.
For some time thereafter, the OCC took policing entry to
be central to its mission. As late as 1976, the OCC asserted
that "[t]he vital relationship of banking to the monetary
system precludes complete free market operation with
unlimited entry."201 The OCC looked at "[t]he current
economic condition or growth potential of the market in which
the new bank proposes to locate" when considering bank
charter applications.202 This was a firm assertion of the OCC's
bank chartering prerogatives.
In 1980, though, apparently under pressure from
Congress,203 the OCC announced a major "shift in
emphasis."204 It would no longer deny bank charters due to
"the distressed condition of a market [or] the existence of an
'adequate' number of banking offices."205 The "convenience
and needs of communities for banking services," it now opined,
197 See Jones, supra note 194, at 454-55.
198 See Transportation Act, 1920 (Esch-Cummins Act), Pub. L. No. 66-
152, § 402, 41 Stat. 456, 477-78.
199 See, e.g., Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, § 401,
52 Stat. 973, 987-89.
200 See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 214, 48 Stat.
1064, 1075-76.
20, Bank Charters, Branches, Conversions, Etc., 41 Fed. Reg. 47,964,
47,964 (Nov. 1, 1976); see also EUGENE N. WHITE, THE CoMPrROLLER AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BANKING, 1960-1990, at 53-54 (1992).
202 Bank Charters, Branches, Conversions, Etc., 41 Fed. Reg. at 47,965.
203 See WHITE, supra note 201, at 54-55.
204 Rules, Policies and Procedures for Corporate Activities; Charter
Policy, 45 Fed. Reg. 68,603, 68,603 (Oct. 15, 1980).
205 Id.
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"are best served by a high degree of competition[.j"206
Accordingly, "market conditions alone will rarely provide the
basis for denial."207 No doubt influenced by the prevailing
deregulatory ethos of the time, the OCC stated that "the
marketplace normally is the best regulator of economic
activity, and competition allows the marketplace to
function[.]"208 By equating "convenience and needs" with
"competition"-which can only favor approving a charter
application-the OCC effectively read the "convenience and
needs" factor out of the statute.
In 1991, Congress followed the OCC's lead. It
unceremoniously deleted the provision-originating with the
1935 Act-requiring that the OCC certify to the FDIC that it
had considered the six statutory factors for each new bank
charter.20 9 Thereafter, the OCC no longer had any statutory
obligation to consider the convenience and needs of the
community. This is where things stand today. The OCC's
chartering standards now place primary emphasis on the
organizing group and its operating plan; "convenience and
needs of the community" is no longer a factor.210
As the foregoing capsule history shows, bank chartering in
the United States has oscillated between the poles of
discretion and no discretion. Its current resting point-as a
matter of both statutory directive and agency policy-is on the
side of no discretion. Under the intermediation paradigm, this
is desirable. Competition is the touchstone, and more charters
mean more competition. Regulators should not inquire into
whether there are already "enough" banks. The decision to
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 68,605.
209 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 115(a), 105 Stat. 2236, 2249.
210 The OCC still considers whether the bank "[c]an reasonably be
expected to achieve and maintain profitability"-a much more permissive
standard. 12 C.F.R. § 5.20 (2018). The OCC "may" also consider the six
statutory factors required of the FDIC in deposit insurance application
decisions, but the OCC's current licensing manual omits any mention of
convenience and needs. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
COMPTROLLER'S LICENSING MANUAL: CHARTERS (2016).
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establish a bank, like the decision to establish a supermarket
or dry cleaning business, should be left to "market" forces. As
will now become apparent, the money paradigm sees things
very differently.
C. An Infrastructure Perspective
As noted above, the system of rate regulation described in
Part II would require effective entry restriction into "money"
creation, functionally defined. This Section assumes that this
is both feasible and desirable. Once entry is restricted, only
the government itself and its franchisees (if any) may create
money. But how should the government decide whether to
outsource to franchisees in the first place? And if it decides to
outsource, how many franchisees should be selected, and what
should be the criteria for selection? Put differently: How
should regulators exercise discretion in bank chartering?
To get at these questions, it is useful first to consider the
fully insourced setting that we envisioned in Part II, in which
everyone holds his or her transaction account directly with the
central bank and no private firms offer account money or close
substitutes therefor. In the money paradigm, this is the
institutional baseline-it is the natural starting point for
analysis. The government monopolizes (dollar-denominated)
money creation.211
The first question is whether to outsource at all. We can
break down this question by examining the activities reflected
by the right side of the central bank's balance sheet (account
money and, if desired, paper money) and the left side
(investment assets). Starting with the right side, there are two
basic functions: processing account-money payments among
users, and printing and distributing paper money. There are
no obvious reasons to outsource these routinized, ministerial,
211 Lest this seem farfetched, note that one version of this approach,
called "full reserve banking," has a very distinguished intellectual lineage.
See generally IRVING FISHER, 100% MONEY (3d ed. 1945); MILTON FRIEDMAN,
A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY STABILITY 65-76 (Fordham U. Press, 1992)
(1959); HENRY C. SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 62-65
(1948).
MONEY AS INFRASTRUCTURENo. 3:757]
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LA W REVIEW
processing functions. The U.S. government, like other
national governments, already prints and distributes paper
money and enforces anti-counterfeiting laws. These are basic
prerequisites for modern fiat money systems. The Federal
Reserve, like other modern central banks, also processes
account-money payments among banks through its Fedwire
system.212 A fully insourced account-money system would
mean doing this on a much larger scale, but the basic
function-processing debits and credits in a ledger-is the
same. These functions are not obvious candidates for any kind
of franchising.213
In fact, outsourcing the account-money system may be a
recipe for problems. A general payment system must operate
as a system, which means that horizontal interconnections
among resource providers are essential. The histories of bank
clearinghouses214 and the Federal Reserve's decades-long
efforts to enforce "par" check clearing on U.S. banks215
illustrate the degree to which account-money services
necessarily involve extensive horizontal coordination and
interconnection.216 Fragmentation impedes the account-
money system's functioning. For a vivid illustration, consider
the fact that bank-based payments often take days to clear in
the United States whereas in many other countries, such as
the United Kingdom, they clear virtually instantly.217 The
principal reason is that the U.S. banking system is orders of
212 See FED. RESERVE, supra note 48, at 122-24.
213 Civil liberty and privacy concerns may weigh in favor of
outsourcing, but as shown by extensive U.S. anti-money laundering rules,
banks may be enlisted in law enforcement notwithstanding.
214 See Gary Gorton, Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking
in the United States, 45 J. ECON. HIST. 277 (1985).
215 See Hal S. Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1978).
216 Compare investment companies-classic financial intermediaries-
where no such horizontal interconnections exist.
217 The Federal Reserve has convened a Faster Payments Task Force
to improve payment speed. See FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, THE U.S.
PATH TO FASTER PAYMENTS (2017).
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magnitude more fragmented.218 When there is just one
ledger-as in the fully insourced system considered here-
payments can be executed instantly through ledger entries,
with no need for back-end coordination and settlement.
The left side of the balance sheet presents a very different
set of considerations. Governments have usually found it
convenient to issue money by acquiring investment assets,
credit assets in particular (lending and bond-buying). There
are good reasons for this. Issuing money in this way affords
flexibility in monetary expansion and contraction, and it
allows for a high degree of administrative independence in
executing monetary policy.219  But investing, unlike
transaction processing by ledger entry, is far from a routinized
function. It is informationally intensive, and systematic errors
are costly. Nor can the central bank rely on market efficiency
to protect it from investing errors. The liquid bond markets
are only so large. Under insourcing, the central bank's balance
sheet may be quite large in relation to these markets. The
central bank's activities may therefore push bond prices
around and distort resource allocation.220 To avoid this, the
218 For an engaging podcast treatment of why "the invisible pipes that
carry money from one place to another [in America] . . . are so slow" and
why the ones in England are so much faster, listen to David Kestenbaum &
Alex Blumberg, Planet Money: The Economy Explained Episode 489: The
Invisible Plumbing of Our Economy, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 4, 2013)
https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyld=
2 2 9 2 24 9
64 [https://perma.cc/JJ4D-TVWN].
219 For a succinct explanation of the traditional rationale for monetary
policy independence, see Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys. Bd.
of Governors, Remarks at the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies
International Conference (May 26, 2010). For a nuanced treatment of
Federal Reserve independence, historically and conceptually, see PETER
CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
(2016).
220 The Fed faced these issues squarely in 2000, in the face of large
budget surpluses and dwindling quantities of outstanding Treasury
securities. See Marvin Goodfriend, Policy Debates at the Federal Open
Market Committee: 1993-2002, in THE ORIGINS, HISTORY, AND FUTURE OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE: A RETURN TO JEKYLL ISLAND 332, 355-56 (Michael D.
Bordo & William Roberds eds., 2013).
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central bank could diversify into less liquid or illiquid
markets, such as direct lending. Here, securities market
efficiency offers no protection to the central bank against
overpayment. Lending requires local and industry-specific
knowledge and continuous expert judgment.221 This
investment function is a good candidate for outsourcing:
establishing incentive arrangements that reward successful
profit-seeking. The idea is to harness private incentives to
invest well. As an added bonus, outsourcing insulates the
investment process from the appearance or reality of
politically motivated favoritism.
Bank chartering, on this view, is an exercise in portfolio
management. Bank owners (equity holders) put some of their
own wealth down as a first-loss equity position. The better and
more efficiently they invest, the more they profit. The
investment process is removed from direct government
decision-making, allaying concerns about politicized asset
allocation. As in any principal-agent relationship, incentives
are not perfectly aligned. With the government holding a
senior claim on each franchisee's asset portfolio, franchisees
have incentives to increase risk-taking. Such moral-hazard
incentives are endemic to credit and insurance markets, and
there are standard mechanisms to deal with them, including
risk constraints and first-loss requirements (capital
requirements or deductibles). These are core features of the
banking regulatory "contract."222
With this rationale for outsourcing in hand, we can turn to
the second question: how many franchisees should be selected
and on what basis? It is important to be clear about what is
not being asked. First, the question is not how much aggregate
221 Walter Bagehot wrestled with this issue in his classic work on
central banking. See WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF
THE MONEY MARKET 88-89 (1873) ("A central bank, which is governed in the
capital and descends on a country district, has much fewer modes of lending
money safely than a bank of which the partners belong to that district, and
know the men and things in it.... The worst people will come to him and
ask for loans. His ignorance is a mark for all the shrewd and crafty people
thereabouts.").
222 See RICKS, supra note 19, at 204-12; Black et al., supra note 139.
[Vol. 2018
credit the banking system should extend. Ten trillion dollars
in loans and bonds can be held by one bank or split between
ten banks, a hundred banks, or more. Second, the question is
not (necessarily) about the distribution of credit. The number
of chartered banks has no necessary relation to who gets a
bank loan. This point will be discussed with a caveat below;
for now, assume that the number of chartered banks has no
influence on the total quantity or distribution of bank loans.
How then should the central bank decide how many banks
to charter? Consider the question from a portfolio
management perspective. It would be foolish to entrust the
whole portfolio to a single manager. No large endowment
would put all its eggs in one basket. Diversification among
managers is called for; if one or a few franchisees turn out to
be inept or corrupt, the damage is limited. On the other hand,
adding new managers is administratively costly, since they
must be monitored (the bank supervisory function). And there
is a subtler, but even more important, cost to adding new
managers: for any given set of underlying investments and
any given aggregate quantity of first-loss equity, combining
portfolios reduces risk to the senior claimant (in this case, the
government).223 This factor weighs in favor of fewer
franchisees with larger portfolios. Indeed, if diversification
among managers was not an issue, a single franchisee would
be optimal.
These portfolio- management considerations suggest a
basis for determining the optimal number of chartered banks.
The benefits of more franchisees (greater manager
diversification) should be weighed against the costs
(administrative costs, plus portfolio risk to the government
per unit of money issued). While this Article does not
223 The central bank as senior claimant in effect has written a "put
option" on each franchisee's portfolio. It owns a portfolio of options, one for
each franchisee. Assuming the central bank wants a safe portfolio, it will
seek to minimize the fair value of the options it writes. It is an axiom of
options theory that an "option on a portfolio" costs less than a "portfolio of
options." See Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 BELL
J. ECON. & MGMT SC. 141, 148 (1973).
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undertake a quantitative estimate, it strains belief to think
the optimal number of banks on these criteria should be as
numerous as the 5700 insured banks in the United States
today.224 Even less plausible is that they should vary in size
from tiny to huge, with the largest insured bank exceeding the
smallest by a factor of over 600,000.225 Surely, one hundred
banks of roughly equal size, with each managing about one
percent of the total portfolio, would provide ample manager
diversification-maybe much more than needed.
Now for the caveat, which relates to credit distribution.
There is a widespread sense that smaller, community banks
serve a distinctive and important role in supplying
"relationship" loans to certain classes of borrowers, such as
small businesses. If true, this would weigh in favor of
chartering larger numbers of smaller banks. But these claims
should be treated with some caution. Empirically, there are
reasons to question the extent of small business' reliance on
"relationship" loans,226 as well as their assumed preference for
borrowing from community banks.227 Moreover, concerns
about credit distribution might be better addressed through
regulatory mechanisms or direct subsidies rather than by
chartering more banks. Under the Community Reinvestment
Act, U.S. banks are required to take measures to "[meet] the
credit needs of [their] entire communit[ies], including low-
and moderate-income neighborhoods. "228 And explicit
subsidies for small business lending, or for lending to other
224 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Quarterly Banking Profile, FDIC Q., Third
Quarter 2017, at 1.
225 For a list of all FDIC-insured banks by asset size, see Details and
Financials - Institution Directory, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
https://www5.fdic.gov/idasp/advSearchLanding.asp
[https://perma.cc/TK3D-NAWS].
226 See Augusto de la Torre, Maria Soledad Martinez Peria & Sergio L.
Schmukler, Bank Involvement with SMEs: Beyond Relationship Lending,
34 J. BANKING & FIN. 2280 (2010).
227 See Allen N. Berger, William Goulding & Tara Rice, Do Small
Businesses Still Prefer Community Banks?, 44 J. BANKING & FIN. 264, 264
(2014).
228 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1).
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market segments, do not rely on small banks for their
efficacy.229
Finally, and most importantly, banks have no legal
monopoly on extending credit.230 Entry into lending is not
restricted. In a competitive lending market, one should
generally expect loans to be supplied at marginal cost. Even
granting market imperfections, market forces should be
expected to ensure reasonable access to credit for creditworthy
borrowers, irrespective of how many banks are chartered. And
in the rate regulation system described in Part II, banks'
funding costs are unsubsidized, so one should not expect bank
loans to carry systematically lower rates than loans by
nonbanks.
Congress's explicit purpose in enacting the National Bank
Act of 1864 was to "provide a national currency"231-not to
"regulate financial intermediation" or anything like that. The
intermediation paradigm has obscured this animating
purpose. In so doing, it has left U.S. bank regulation in a
conceptual muddle. Efficient deposit rate regulation of the
type described in Part II would necessitate restricting entry
into "money" creation, functionally defined. The money
paradigm allows us to see bank chartering as procurement: an
exercise in portfolio management. Procurement implies
discretionary selection, and traditional infrastructure
regulation supplies a well-established model for this
regulatory function.
229 Small business loans, student loans, and residential mortgage loans
each receive some degree of federal government support.
230 There has admittedly been some confusion on this score in state
"unauthorized banking" statutes; however, insofar as these provisions
purport to restrict entry into "discounting" or other forms of credit
extension, they have for the most part been ignored. For an incisive
treatment, see Homer Kripke, Illegal "Discounts" by Non-Banking
Corporations in New York, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1183 (1956).
231 National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106 (preamble), 13 Stat. 99, 99.
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IV. UNIVERSAL SERVICE AND THE UN- AND
UNDER-BANKED
This Part now pivots from the rarefied spheres of monetary
policy and bank chartering to the ground-level public interface
of the monetary system. Here again, the money paradigm
opens up a way of thinking about bank regulatory policy that
the intermediation paradigm cannot readily accommodate-
and infrastructure regulation supplies a time-tested
regulatory model.
A. Access to the Mainstream Payment System
It is well-documented that the mainstream payment
system is beyond the reach of many Americans.
Approximately 6.5% of U.S. households-comprising fourteen
million adults and six million children-do not have a bank
account.2 32 These unbanked households use a mishmash of
techniques to make and receive payments. To convert their
paychecks and other checks into cash, these consumers may
visit a branch of the bank that issued the check. Such a branch
may or may not be conveniently located or have convenient
hours. Alternatively, they may cash checks at retail stores
(such as grocery, drug, or convenience stores) or standalone
check-cashing businesses. Nonbank check cashing is
expensive; service providers typically charge 1.5% to 3.5% of
face value.233 By comparison, most banked households use
direct deposit for paychecks, which is convenient and free.
For routine bills, the unbanked often cannot use efficient
online payment methods. They often stand in line at bill pay
centers to pay in cash. They rely heavily on nonbank money
orders, which are subject to fees. They commonly transfer
money within the United States through expensive wire
transfer outlets, such as Western Union or Moneygram. In
232 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2017 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF
UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 17 (2018) [hereinafter 2017
FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY].
233 Michael S. Barr & Rebecca M. Blank, Savings, Assets, and Banking
Among Low-Income Households: Introduction and Overview, in
INSUFFICIENT FUNDS 3 (Rebecca M. Blank & Michael S. Barr eds., 2009).
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recent years, the unbanked have increasingly turned to
prepaid debit cards, which are available at a variety of retail
locations, to meet payment needs. These cards, too, are subject
to various types of fees, including upfront fees, monthly fees,
transaction fees, cash reload fees, ATM fees, account
statement fees, customer service call fees, and online bill pay
fees.234 Prepaid cards have recently experienced service
interruptions, leaving their users unable to access funds for
days at a time.
23 5
For those lacking a bank account-a disproportionately
low-income population236-the pecuniary and nonpecuniary
costs (including time and distance costs) of basic transaction
services are high. According to one recent study, "A worker
earning minimum wage, working full-time, and making under
$12,000 a year might pay $250 to $500 annually to cash
payroll checks at a check-cashing outlet, in addition to fees for
money orders, wire transfers, bill payments, and other
common transactions."237  Middle- and high-income
households generally avoid such costs. "Basic transactional
services-receiving income, storing it, and paying bills-are
less available and more expensive for low-income
households."238
234 For example, see the fee chart for the RushCard Prepaid Visa. Fee
Chart, RusHCARD, www.rushcard.com/fee-chart [https://perma.ccWX28-
2BQ3]; see also Prepaid Accounts Under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act
(Regulation E) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 81 Fed. Reg.
83,934, 83,937, 83,954 (Nov. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Regs. E and Z].
235 See Stacy Cowley, Senators Press for Answers After Prepaid Debit
Cards Fail, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/business/dealbook/senators-press-for-
answers-after-prepaid-debit-cards-fail.html [https://perma.cc/2U8U-
NE6U]; Liz Moyer & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, RushCard Breakdown
Affects Thousands of Prepaid Debit Card Users, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/business/dealbook/after-technical-
snag-fury-and-no-cash.html [https://perma.cc/GR56-8N9U].
236 Barr & Blank, supra note 233, at 3.
237 Id. at 4.
238 Id. at 14.
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Bank accounts, as currently structured, are inhospitable or
simply unavailable to many consumers. Minimum balance
requirements are a major obstacle for households living
paycheck to paycheck, as are delays in check clearance.
Account fees, including annual fees and bounced check fees,
are substantial for low-balance depositors and may deter
them from opening or retaining accounts. A history of bounced
checks may also preclude access to a bank account. Banks use
the private ChexSystem to screen out users who have had
problems with checking accounts in the past.2 39 Also, bank
branch locations are less prevalent in low-income
communities, and their hours of operation are inconvenient
for many prospective users. Cultural and sociological factors
also come into play. Among the unbanked, a frequently cited
reason for lacking a bank account is dislike or distrust of
banks.240
It is not only the unbanked who are ill-served by the
existing payments architecture. Another 18.7% of U.S.
households-comprising forty-nine million adults and fifteen
million children-are "underbanked," meaning that, despite
having a bank account, they rely to some degree on expensive
nonbank services for payments and other financial needs.2 41
For example, these underbanked households, which are
predominately low- or moderate-income, may resort to
expensive nonbank check cashing for reasons of convenience
and immediacy of payment.2 42
The plight of the un- and underbanked has attracted
intermittent regulatory and legislative attention in the
United States, but without meaningful results. The
239 See James Marvin P6rez, Note, Blacklisted: The Unwarranted
Divestment of Access to Bank Accounts, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1586, 1586 (2005).
240 See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2013 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF
UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 24 (2014).
241 See 2017 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 232, at 17.
242 See RACHEL SCHNEIDER & BALAFAMA LONGJOHN, CENT. FOR FIN.
SERVS. INNOVATION, BEYOND CHECK-CASHING: AN EXAMINATION OF
CONSUMER DEMAND AND BUSINESS INNOVATION FOR IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO
CHECK FUNDS (2014).
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percentage of Americans who were unbanked appears to have
spiked around the time that deposit interest rate controls
were phased out in the early 1980s.243 Some analysts have
inferred causality, suggesting that increased competition
caused banks to eliminate unprofitable services and close
branches in less prosperous areas.
244
Whatever the catalyst, consumer advocates drew attention
to the issue in the mid-1980s.245 In 1987 the federal bank
regulatory agencies, in conjunction with state bank
supervisors, adopted an interagency policy statement on the
topic. The statement expressed "concerns" over apparent
declines in account ownership, "encourage[d]" the banking
industry "to meet certain minimum needs of all consumers,"
and expressed confidence that the industry could mount a
"constructive response without the rigidities of legislation or
regulation."246 Around the same time, states began
considering legislation to address the issue. Several states
adopted "lifeline account" legislation in the late 1980s and
early 1990s requiring that state-chartered commercial banks
offer low-cost, basic accounts. Take-up was lackluster for a
variety of reasons. Customers living paycheck to paycheck
need payment immediacy, which limits the appeal of even low-
cost accounts. Locational convenience, consumer sentiment,
and lack of consumer information also played a role.
247
Empirically, lifeline banking legislation had virtually no effect
243 See Ebonya Washington, The Impact of Banking and Fringe
Banking Regulation on the Number of Unbanked Americans, 41 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 106, 112 tbl.2 (2006).
244 See, e.g., JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING
OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 87-88 (1994); Glenn B. Canner & Ellen
Maland, Basic Banking, 73 FED. RES. BULL. 255, 255-56 (1987).
245 See Edward L. Rubin, The Lifeline Banking Controversy: Putting
Deregulation to Work for the Low-Income Consumer, 67 IND. L.J. 213, 215-
16 (1992).
246 Interagency Policy Statement on Basic Financial Services, 52 Fed.
Reg. 7,024, 7,024-25 (Mar. 6, 1987).
247 See Joseph J. Doyle, Jose A. Lopez & Marc R. Saidenberg, How
Effective is Lifeline Banking in Assisting the 'Unbanked'?, 4 CURRENT ISSUES
IN ECON. & FIN. 1, 3-5 (1998).
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on the number of unbanked households in the relevant
states.248
At the federal level, Congress has held hearings on lifeline
accounts over the years,249 but no legislation materialized.
The Federal Reserve opposed federal lifeline banking
legislation in 1989 on the ground that "voluntary efforts by
financial institutions will continue to be successful in meeting
many of the concerns that have been expressed without the
burden and cost that rules and regulations inevitably
impose."250
The U.S. Treasury Department achieved limited success
through its Electronic Transfer Accounts program, whereby it
compensates federally insured banks for providing basic bank
accounts to beneficiaries of government transfers.251
However, because this program supplies accounts only to
recipients of federal benefits, its reach is necessarily
limited.252 The Treasury Department has piloted another
initiative, the First Accounts Program, to support private
organizations that seek to assist the unbanked, but the
program is very small.2 53 In 2011, the FDIC launched a Model
Safe Accounts Pilot with nine financial institutions to explore
the feasibility of offering stripped-down transaction accounts
248 See Washington, supra note 243, at 108.
249 See Ways of Increasing Access of Low- and Moderate-Income
Americans to Financial Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin.
Insts. Supervision, Regulation & Deposit Ins. and the Subcomm. on
Consumer Credit & Ins. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. & Urban Affairs,
103d Cong. 1-3 (1994); Government Check Cashing, "Lifeline" Checking,
and the Community Reinvestment Act: Hearings on S. 906, S. 907, and S.
909 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer & Regulatory Affairs of the S. Comm.
on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. 1 (1989).
250 Martha R. Seger, Statement by Martha R. Seger, Member, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before the Subcommittee on
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs of the Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, June 7, 1989, 75 FED. RES. BULL. 550, 557
(1989).
251 See Electronic Transfer Account, 64 Fed. Reg. 38,510, 38,510 (July
16, 1999).
252 See Prez, supra note 239, at 1601.
253 See id. at 1601-02.
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to meet the needs of underserved consumers, including the
unbanked.254 While the pilot was successful, it did not lead to
any substantial permanent initiative.
Opposition to direct legislative or regulatory mandates for
banks to supply transaction accounts to underserved
populations has usually proceeded from the supposition that
such requirements inefficiently "tax" banks or otherwise
impose unwarranted "social" obligations on private
enterprise.255 Scholarly treatments tend to eschew direct
mandates in favor of other strategies, such as further
deregulation (with the aspiration of reducing costs and
spurring access to accounts),256 tax incentives to banks for
providing basic accounts to underserved groups,257 or direct
government provisioning.258 In the next Section, this Article
will outline a more promising regulatory model for addressing
the needs of the un- and underbanked. Before proceeding to
the regulatory analysis, though, it is useful to ask whether the
marketplace might supply solutions on its own.
B. Bypassing Bank-Based Payments?
Do banks need to be involved in payments at all? Could
nonbanks offer cheaper, more efficient payment solutions to
underserved populations? Might the steady march of
technology solve these problems?
It is tempting to respond that the plight of the unbanked
has been on the policy radar for over three decades and the
market has not yet furnished a solution. In fairness,
enthusiasts for market solutions may respond that regulatory
impediments are to blame. But this seems doubtful. Part III.A
reviewed the porous, ineffective nature of U.S. legal
254 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC MODEL SAFE ACCOUNTS PILOT: FINAL
REPORT 1 (Apr. 2012).
255 See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 245, at 224-26.
256 See id. at 240-48.
257 See Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 222-
33 (2004).
258 See MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION,
EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 210-25 (2015).
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constraints on entering the money creation business. I have
argued in the past that it is vital to shore up these
restrictions-for reasons having to do with financial
instability, monetary control, and private capture of
seigniorage259-but set that aside. If existing regulatory
constraints are ineffective, then they are not meaningfully
impeding the market. Nor are anti-money laundering and
"know your customer" rules a likely culprit; their cost didn't
become meaningful until the early 2000s,260 whereas the
problem of the unbanked has been around for much longer. So
regulation can't shoulder the blame, at least not all of it. In
fact, there is reason to think that deregulation of deposit
interest rates exacerbated the problem.261
Promisingly, payment innovation has surged in recent
years. New services like Apple Pay, Android Pay, and Venmo
have become a meaningful part of the payments landscape.
PayPal has been a major player in payments for even longer.
But these services don't offer adequate substitutes for the
mainstream payment system. PayPal and Venmo are closed
systems that process payments only among existing users;
they are not general-purpose payment systems. And both
require users to have a bank or credit card account.262 Apple
Pay and Android Pay are general-purpose, but they too must
link to an existing bank or credit card account. As a practical
matter, these services remain unavailable to unbanked
households. Further, one should not exaggerate the extent to
which these new interfaces bypass the traditional, bank-
centered payments system. All these consumer interfaces are
259 RICKS, supra note 19, at 230-40; Ricks, supra note 44.
260 These costs escalated dramatically as a consequence of the USA
Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
261 See supra notes 242-243 and accompanying text.
262 According to one authority, PayPal does not "[present] a 'new'
payment system, [but relies] on existing systems (credit cards, debit cards,
checking accounts, and ACH transfers) to make payments. Essentially, [it]
uses the technology of the Web site to facilitate the use of conventional
payment networks." RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER
FINANcIAL TRANSACTIONS 313 (5th ed. 2011).
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"new technologies running on old rails."263 They provide
"mirages of financial disintermediation."264
A more serious case for a "market" solution can be mounted
on behalf of prepaid cards, discussed briefly above.265 Prepaid
cards are among the fastest-growing payment devices in the
United States, and they have achieved meaningful market
penetration in unbanked and underbanked populations. Some
prepaid cards approach the functionality of checking accounts,
offering services such as direct deposit, automatic bill pay, and
online or mobile device access. Compared to traditional bank
accounts, though, prepaid cards are expensive. According to
one 2014 study, the median prepaid card user pays between
$120 and $360 annually in card fees.26 6 It is possible that
these fees have decreased somewhat in the ensuing years due
to increased competition. Still, for unbanked and
underbanked households, a large proportion of which make
less than $30,000 per year267, these fees are a significant
expense.
But are prepaid cards really a nonbank payment system?
They piggyback on existing payment network rails (point of
sale terminals and ATMs) whose primary function is to service
bank-centric products (credit and debit cards). More than
that, in most cases the prepaid card issuer is a bank.268 More
accurately, the bank issues an account linked to the card, in
the same way that a debit card links to a bank deposit
account.269 It is common to speak of "money" being "stored" or
"loaded" on a prepaid card, but in fact the "money" consists of
263 BARR ET AL., supra note 187, at 796.
264 Tom C. W. Lin, Infinite Financial Intermediation, 50 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 643, 643-44, 656 (2015).
265 See supra notes 234-235 and accompanying text. The discussion
here relates to so-called "general purpose reloadable" cards.
266 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, CONSUMERS CONTINUE TO LOAD UP ON
PREPAID CARDS 39 (2014).
267 See 2017 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 232, at 19-20.
268 Regs. E and Z, supra note 234, at 83,939.
269 Hence the CFPB quite sensibly opts for the term "prepaid accounts"
rather than "prepaid cards." See id. at 83,934.
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a bank deposit that is associated with the card. The prepaid
card program manager, which is typically a nonbank,
establishes the bank account and manages it on a pooled,
custodial basis for all cardholders.270 Obviously, either the
program manager or the bank itself must demarcate each
individual cardholder's entitlement to a portion of the pooled
account.271 The FDIC supplies "pass-through" deposit
insurance to cardholders so long as they are the "actual
owners" of the deposit-in other words, so long as the program
manager is acting as custodian.272 As the FDIC notes, "the
access mechanism [i.e., the card itself] is merely a device....
The 'deposit' is the underlying money."273 From the FDIC's
standpoint, then, the prepaid cardholder is the actual owner
of a bank deposit account which is accessed by the card. One
might fairly question what relevant distinction exists between
such a "prepaid card," on the one hand, and a bank deposit
account accessed via debit card that lacks an overdraft
feature, on the other. Unbanked households that use prepaid
cards are, in this sense, banked-but in a high-cost way, one
subject to elevated operational risk.274
Whether this is a good way of banking the unbanked is
another question. These products' fee structures may exploit
consumers' behavioral biases. But even if prepaid card fees
just reflect the cost of provision, we can fairly ask whether cost
ought to determine how this particular resource-mainstream
payment system access-gets allocated. The money paradigm
points toward a different set of distributive considerations.
C. An Infrastructure Perspective
As in Parts II and III, we can organize our thinking about
mainstream payment system access by first considering a
270 See id. at 83,940.
271 See id. at 83,940.
272 Insurability of Funds Underlying Stored Value Cards and Other
Nontraditional Access Mechanisms, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,155, 67,156 (Nov. 13,
2008).
273 Id. at 67,157.
274 See Regs. E and Z, supra note 234, at 83,939.
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fully insourced system in which everyone holds his or her
transaction account directly with the central bank. No private
firm offers account money or close substitutes therefor. This
would be direct government provisioning of (dollar-
denominated) account money, just as the U.S. government
currently supplies physical currency as a monopolist. This is
the money paradigm's institutional baseline. How might the
central bank in this insourced setting determine who gets
access to transaction accounts and under what terms?
The main issue is cost. Every new account imposes some
incremental cost on the central bank. It must supply account
holders with some means of payment, such as debit cards or
checkbooks. They presumably will receive periodic account
statements, whether in paper form or electronically. There
will be some incremental customer service cost. The payment
system as a whole will see more traffic, the cost of which,
though infinitesimal at the margin for each new account, is
still positive.
So long as the central bank does not offer overdraft
privileges, none of this requires any customer credit analysis
by the central bank. There is no necessary connection between
the left side of the central bank's balance sheet (investment
assets) and the right side (transaction accounts). Consumers
can get credit, including point-of-sale revolving credit (credit
cards), from third parties that likewise hold transaction
accounts with the central bank.275 The terms and conditions
of such private credit arrangements are a matter of private
contract to which the central bank is not a party. The central
bank's payment function here consists of mechanical
processing, not judgment-intensive, individualized credit
underwriting. Upon receipt of an authenticated instruction-
card swipe, check, automatic bill payment, etc.-the central
bank debits the payer's account and credits the payee's
account.
Even if credit-underwriting costs are nonexistent, the
other costs are real and must be covered. One possibility
275 It would be trivial to link such privately-supplied revolving credit
facilities to transaction accounts, such that any overages would be charged
automatically to the credit facility.
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would be to charge these costs directly to users. The central
bank could offer transaction accounts only to those customers
who fully covered their own incremental costs through, say,
periodic fees. This would be an application of marginal cost
pricing, the competitive-market benchmark. Under standard
economic theory, prices in competitive markets equilibrate to
marginal cost.276 Prominent experts have argued that, where
rate regulation is called for, regulators should aim for
marginal cost pricing.277 The idea is to mimic the pricing
structure and efficient resource allocation that would prevail
under perfect competition.
The efficiency of marginal cost pricing rests upon the
absence of externalities. However, broad access to transaction
accounts should generate positive spillovers in at least two
ways. First, the account-money system has positive network
externalities, meaning that adding new users makes the
system more valuable to existing users.278 For example,
employers are better off when their employees have
transaction accounts. Payroll can then be processed through
convenient direct deposit rather than by cutting physical
checks. Similarly, some classes of vendors benefit when their
customers have transaction accounts that can support
convenient auto-pay relationships. Such arrangements avoid
the cost of dealing with physical payment media while also
improving payment timeliness and regularity. And the
government itself accrues positive network externalities when
more residents have transaction accounts. Making transfer
payments to, and receiving tax payments from, unbanked
individuals is costly and inefficient. Broader access to
276 See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 312-13
(7th ed. 2014).
277 See, e.g., ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION:
PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 63-86 (1988).
278 For general treatments of network effects that discuss legal and
regulatory implications, see Nicholas Economides, Competition Policy in
Network Industries: An Introduction, in THE NEW ECONOMY AND BEYOND:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 96, 96-121 (Dennis W. Jansen ed., 2006); Mark
A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Effects, 86
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1998).
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transaction accounts would therefore facilitate the
administration of public services, including public assistance.
Adding new active members to the account-money system,
then, benefits existing network users.
Second and more broadly, the system of money and
payments is integral to commercial life-it comes into play in
practically every commercial transaction-and commerce
itself is a spillover-rich activity. "The positive externalities
[arising from voluntary association and trade] are often
ignored," writes Richard Epstein.279 But in reality "[t]he
successful conclusion of any voluntary transaction among two
or more people routinely increases the opportunities for
association and trade available to everyone else."28 0 Writing
three decades earlier, Carol Rose said much the same: "The
more people who engage in trade, the greater the
opportunities for all to make valuable exchanges[.]"
28 l
Whereas Epstein enlisted positive externalities from
commerce to support classical liberal principles of freedom of
contract and association, Rose sought to shed light on public
property doctrines:
Through ever-expanding commerce, the nation
becomes ever-wealthier, and hence trade and
commerce routes must be held open to the public, even
if contrary to private interest.
... . The individuals involved in commerce help
themselves, but they help others as well, and they
need encouragement to do so; thus the cost of the
locations necessary for commerce-particularly
transport facilities-should be kept at a minimum,
and perhaps be borne by the organized community at
common expense. Nineteenth-century doctrine
279 Richard Epstein, Freedom of Association and Antidiscrimination




281 Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Commerce, Custom,
and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 769-70 (1986).
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attempted to maintain public access to these locations,
even at the expense of exclusive ownership rights.
The protection of commerce was clearly the central
object of earlier "inherently public property" doctrines.
Commerce, of all activities, is ever more valuable as
more participate.282
Rose focused on transport facilities (roads and waterways)
but her analysis applies with equal force to the mainstream
payment system. If spillovers are present, supplying
transaction accounts to some or all users at prices below cost
may be efficiency-enhancing.
So, in the insourced setting described above, the central
bank might maximize social welfare by promoting broad or
even universal access to transaction accounts, even if this
means furnishing accounts to some or all users at prices below
marginal cost. The simplest approach would be to charge
users nothing at all. Transaction accounts could be offered for
free to all comers, subject to any desired screening for law
enforcement and national security objectives.28 3 Because the
mainstream payment system is not depletable or congestible,
"commons"-type concerns are irrelevant. These are ledger
entries, not consumption goods, and there is no legitimate
reason to worry about "excessive" use. In microeconomic
terms, the mainstream payment system is nonrival. Public
goods combine nonrivalry with non-excludability. While the
mainstream payment system is excludable, it does not follow
that exclusion is good public policy. Account money could
instead function like paper money: an open-access resource
with costs borne by the public at large. In the presence of
spillovers, this strategy may very well maximize efficiency.
Here again we reach the crucial point: nothing about this
analysis changes when the government elects to outsource the
provision of account-money services. The procurement
contract with the government's "franchisees" can readily
282 Id. at 770-74.
283 U.S. banks are required to maintain Customer Identification
Programs as part of their Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering
compliance programs. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(1) (2012).
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include provisions relating to access. The overall regulatory
package must be attractive enough to attract franchisees, but
no particular term of the package is dictated by the mere fact
of outsourcing. If universal service promotes the public
interest, the regulatory compact should include universal
service provisions.
It should come as no surprise that universal service
mandates have long been a central part of the regulatory
contract in U.S. infrastructure industries.284 Today, these
mandates are most commonly seen in local utility-type
services. Electric and gas utilities generally must adequately
serve all consumers within their franchise area-even if this
requires unprofitable investment-and they may not charge
higher prices to more remote consumers.28 5 This is a quid pro
quo of the franchise, a term of the overall regulatory bargain.
State regulators also require telephone companies to offer
service at uniform rates to all residential subscribers in their
service areas, regardless of the cost of serving hard-to-reach
customers.286 In these cases, some consumers pay prices
below fully allocated cost, promoting broad access to
infrastructure services.
Historically, U.S. federal regulators have imposed
universal service mandates on more spatially expansive,
state-spanning infrastructural systems. These mandates were
largely eviscerated in the deregulatory wave of the late 2 0
th
century-a dubious policy development, in my view-but a
brief tour of how they worked is useful. The original model,
and one in which universal service remains operative, is the
postal system. This is a quintessential "insourced" system, but
it is nonetheless instructive. The landmark Post Office Act of
284 This Article uses "universal service" loosely to refer to any context
in which regulated firms must serve some classes of customers at prices
below cost, in order to promote broad access.
285 See, e.g., PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 136, at 217.
286 PETER W. HUBER, MICHAEL K. KELLOGG & JOHN THORNE, FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAw § 2.1.1 (2nd ed. 1999).
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1792287 established procedures to ensure the rapid geographic
expansion of the postal network, including routes that "could
not possibly break even."288 The Act deliberately subsidized
nonpaying remote areas, particularly in the South and
West.2 89 This policy has continued without interruption. It is
the "post office principle:" transferring revenue from populous
areas to thinly settled areas in order to provide postal services
to the entire population.2 90 Since 1863, all U.S. domestic letter
rates have been uniform (weight-based) irrespective of
distance traveled.291 This is a dramatic departure from
287 An Act to Establish the Post-Office and Post-Roads Within the
United States, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 232 (1792).
288 RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL
SYSTEM FROM FRANKLIN TO MORSE 49 (1995) (ebook).
289 RICHARD R. JOHN, GEORGE MASON UNIV., HISTORY OF UNIVERSAL
SERVICE AND THE POSTAL MONOPOLY 21 (Nov. 2008).
http://mars.gmu.edu/bitstream/handle/1920/3477/Appendix%20D.pdfsequ
ence=4&isAllowed=y/ [https://perma.cc/VXR2-M2VA].
290 Id. at 13. Another researcher has observed that, in contemplating
postal reform in the 1840s, "[t]he Congress unanimously believed that the
government had a duty to provide postal service to non-paying frontier and
rural areas." George L. Priest, The History of the Postal Monopoly in the
United States, 18 J.L. & ECON. 33, 65 (1975).
291 U.S. POSTAL SERV., UNIVERSAL SERVICE AND THE POSTAL MONOPOLY:
A BRIEF HISTORY 5 (2008).
[Vol. 2018
marginal cost pricing. Modern postal legislation292 and official
pronouncements2 93 have reaffirmed these principles.
U.S. telecommunications regulation was influenced by the
postal model. In 1910-the year that Congress declared the
telephone and telegraph systems "common carriers" and
placed them under the Interstate Commerce Commission's
("ICC") jurisdiction294-AT&T's leadership explicitly
committed the company to universal service.
2 95 Regulators
followed suit. In the 1920s, state public utility commissions
adopted statewide rate averaging.
29 6 The resulting cross-
subsidies promoted residential telephone service in less
292 See Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375, § 101, 84 Stat. at
719 (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 101(a)) (providing that the postal system "shall
be operated as a basic and fundamental service provided to the people by
the Government of the United States" and that it "shall render postal
services to all communities"); id. (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 101(b)) (providing
that the postal system "shall provide a maximum degree of effective and
regular postal services to rural areas, communities, and small towns where
post offices are not self-sustaining" and that "[nlo small post office shall be
closed solely for operating at a deficit, it being the specific intent of the
Congress that effective postal services be insured to residents of both urban
and rural communities."); id. § 3623, 84 Stat. 719, 761 (1970) (codified at 39
U.S.C. § 404(c)) (mandating continuation of uniform nationwide rates for
each class of mail).
293 See generally PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE U.S. POSTAL SERV.,
EMBRACING THE FUTURE: MAKING THE TOUGH CHOICES TO PRESERVE
UNIVERSAL MAIL SERVICE (2003) (reaffirming the postal system's universal
service mission and endorsing continued uniform rates),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/documents/pcusps-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQN4-TLDP]; U.S. POSTAL SERV., ANNUAL
REPORT 2 (2007), https://about.usps.comlwho-we-are/financials/annual-
reports/fy2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/J65N-KFC8] ("[O]ur mission remains
the same-providing trusted, affordable, universal service."); id. at 59
(defining universal service as providing "uniform and reasonable rates to
everyone, everywhere").
294 Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 539, 544-45 (1910).
295 See RICHARD R. JOHN, NETWORK NATION: INVENTING AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 345 (2010) (ebook).
296 See Richard H.K. Vietor, AT&T and the Public Good: Regulation
and Competition in Telecommunications, 1910-1987, in FUTURE
COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 27, 35 (Stephen P. Bradley & Jerry
A. Hausman eds., 1989).
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populous areas. The Communications Act of 1934, which
created the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"),
made universal service an explicit federal policy.297 By the
early 1940s the FCC had adopted a policy of "equal charges
for equal services," eliminating interstate rate differentials
and leading soon thereafter to de facto nationwide average
pricing.298 This policy benefited rural and small-town
telephone users nationwide. This pricing model ultimately
became unsustainable, owing to regulatory acquiescence in
the 1960s and 1970s to ever-increasing levels of "cream-
skimming" entry by competitors like MCI Communications.299
With the forced breakup of AT&T in 1984, the era of U.S.
telecommunications as a highly integrated, universal system
came to a definitive end.
U.S. transportation industries followed a similar
regulatory (and subsequent deregulatory) pattern. Even
before the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887300-the
foundation stone of U.S. federal administrative regulation-
railroad corporate charters specified the routes that they were
required to serve.301 Railroads could not freely discontinue
service, even if continuation was unprofitable.302 In 1906, the
ICC gained the power to regulate rates directly,303 and in 1920
its powers were broadened to control entry and exit by issuing
certificates of public convenience and necessity.304 As before,
notes one scholar, "carriers were often required to continue
unprofitable services[.]" 305 Universal service in the railroad
297 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064,
1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.).
298 See Vietor, supra note 296, at 46.
299 See id.; see also BREYER, supra note 136, at 285-314.
300 Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
301 THEODORE E. KEELER, RAILROADS, FREIGHT, AND PUBLIC POLICY 21
(1983).
302 Id.
303 Hepburn Act of 1906, ch. 3591, § 2, 34 Stat. 584, 586.
304 Transportation Act, 1920 (Esch-Cummins Act), Pub. L. No. 66-152,
§ 402, 41 Stat. 456, 477-78.
305 KEELER, supra note 301, at 25.
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industry began its decline in 1958, when Congress passed
legislation making it easier for rail companies to discontinue
unprofitable passenger train service.306 The legislation also
endowed the ICC with the authority to reverse state public
utility commission denials of discontinuance applications. 307
Additional legislation from 1973 to 1980 eased exit on the
freight side.30s Since deregulation, service discontinuance and
outright rail line abandonment have been widespread3O9-a
devastating outcome for many rural and smaller
communities.
The motor carrier industry furnishes another example of
universal service mandates in action. The Motor Carrier Act
of 1935 brought bus and trucking companies within the ICC's
jurisdiction.310 Regulation of rates and entry applied, and
motor carriers were required to serve off-line points. The ICC
would suspend carriers' authority for failing to meet these
universal service obligations.311 Money-losing routes were
balanced with more profitable traffic. Legislation in 1980
substantially liberalized entry, exit, and rates for trucking
companies.312 Service to small communities and small
shippers deteriorated.313
306 Transportation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-625, § 5, 72 Stat. 568,
571.
307 Id. at 572.
308 See Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236,
87 Stat. 985; see also Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31; Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-448, 94 Stat. 1895.
309 See FRANK J. DOOLEY & WILLIAM E. THOMS, RAILROAD LAW A DECADE
AFTER DEREGULATION 46 (1994) (discussing the discontinuance of passenger
trains after 1958); see also id. at 18 (noting the abandonment of rail lines in
the 1970s and 1980s).
310 Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543.
311 PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
OF DEREGULATION 28-29 (1989).
312 See Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793.
313 See James P. Rakowski, Marketing Economies and the Results of
Trucking Deregulation in the Less-Than-Truckload Sector, TRANSP. J.,
Spring 1988, at 11, 21 (1980).
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Outcomes were even more extreme in the intercity bus
industry. The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 let bus
companies abandon or discontinue service practically at their
discretion.3 14 As with railroads, it also let the ICC reverse
state public utilities commission denials of service
discontinuance.315 The president of Greyhound had predicted
that "the rural areas are going to have to suffer" under bus
deregulation.316 He predicted correctly. Thousands of smaller
communities lost intercity bus service in short order.317
Finally, U.S. airline regulation went through a broadly
similar pattern. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 brought
federal economic regulation to the infant airline industry.318
As with other transportation industries, entry and rates were
regulated. Over the next few decades the air passenger
network grew exponentially. Pricing was uniform, under an
"equal fares for equal miles" standard.319 Airlines were
awarded more profitable routes to balance their less profitable
routes.320 In the late 1970s this universal service model came
to an end, first through administrative action321 and then
through legislation.322 Comprehensive deregulation of
314 Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, 96 Stat.
1102.
315 Id. § 16(a), 96 Stat. at 1115-1117.
316 DEMPSEY, supra note 311, at 205.
317 Id. at 206. Even Alfred Kahn, the intellectual godfather of
infrastructure deregulation, later questioned the wisdom of this legislation:
"I'm not sure I would ever have deregulated the buses because the bus is a
lifeline of many small communities for people to get to the doctor or to the
Social Security office." Testimony of Alfred Kahn Before the California
Public Utilities Commission 6247-48 (Jan. 31, 1989); see PAUL STEPHEN
DEMPSEY & ANDREW R. GOETZ, AIRLINE DEREGULATION AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE
MYTHOLOGY 279 (1992).
318 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973.
319 BREYER, supra note 136, at 212.
320 Id. at 213.
321 See DEMPSEY, supra note 311, at 20.
322 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 4, 92 Stat.
1705, 1708.
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airlines led to drastic service reductions to small and midsize
cities.323
In each of the foregoing examples-electric and gas
utilities, telecommunications, and transportation-regulated
firms have been required, in one form or fashion, to serve some
classes of users at prices below cost, with a view toward
promoting broad access to infrastructure resources. Insofar as
spillovers are an increasing function of the active user base
(or network penetration) of the resource, such requirements
can be efficiency-enhancing. "Universal service commitments
are not solely normatively grounded in distributional
concerns," notes Brett Frischmann in his influential study of
infrastructural resources.324 "[T]he commitments also have
positive efficiency implications."3
25
Richard Posner argued in a brilliant early article that
regulation of this type can be seen as a branch of public
finance-a way of securing broader access to infrastructural
resources than the market alone would supply.3 26 Internal
cross-subsidies mean that some classes of users, typically
those in higher-density areas, pay higher prices than they
otherwise would. The resulting profits are then used to
provide below-cost services to others. "[I]nternal subsidization
is one method whereby the expansion of the infrastructure
services can be promoted," Posner notes.327 He concludes that
the public-finance theory better accounts for the basic
323 See Andrew R. Goetz & Timothy M. Vowles, The Good, the Bad, and
the Ugly: 30 Years of US Airline Deregulation, 17 J. TRANSP. GEOGRAPHY
251, 252 (2009), https://www. sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0966692309000386 [https://perma.cc/9F3M-FRCQ]; Phillip Longman &
Lina Khan, Terminal Sickness: How a Thirty-Year-Old Policy of
Deregulation Is Slowly Killing America's Airline System, WASH. MONTHLY
(Mar./Apr. 2012), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchapril-
2012/terminal-sickness [https://perma.ccW6Z5-HUW6].
324 BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF
SHARED RESOURCES 223 (2012).
325 Id.
326 Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SC. 22, 39 (1971).
327 Id.
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structure of infrastructure regulation than do other theories
(specifically, the natural monopoly/public interest theory and
the capture/public choice theory). "[S]ociety frequently
subjects to the public utility type of control services that it
wants provided on the broadest possible basis," Posner
writes.328  "The regulated industries are part of the
'infrastructure' of economic growth."329
Cross-subsidies as a method of finance are controversial.
(One noted scholar has described cross-subsidies in the postal
context as "tumorous."330) Some users must pay prices well
above marginal cost. This amounts to an excise tax, which
distorts resource allocation. But Posner argues convincingly
that this criticism is superficial.331 Given the decision to
subsidize-which may be justified on efficiency or other
grounds-funding must come from somewhere. All methods of
taxation distort resource allocation. It is not a priori obvious
that the cross-subsidization excise "tax" is more distortive
than, say, raising more revenue from income taxation. It may
in fact be less distortive, inasmuch as infrastructure users'
demand is often relatively inelastic.332
On top of that, Posner argues internal subsidization has
certain advantages over taxation-plus-direct-subsidization.333
First, it avoids some of the administrative expense of the
formal tax-and-transfer machinery. Second, where average-
cost pricing is adopted (as is often the case), cross-
subsidization avoids the expense of implementing a fine-
grained rate structure. Third, it frees up legislative resources
by delegating a minor taxing function to regulators.
To Posner's list of advantages I would add one more,
related to the last one. By sidestepping legislative
appropriations, internal cross-subsidies hive off
infrastructure resources into self-contained systems that are
relatively insulated from normal political processes. The
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Priest, supra note 290, at 56.
331 See Posner, supra note 326, at 42.
332 See id.
333 See id. at 45.
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rationale for structuring things this way mirrors the standard
rationale for administrative independence. It is a form of
commitment device-a way of reducing the chances that
short-term political expediencies will have longer-term
deleterious effects on certain types of government functions.
With annual legislative appropriations, the legislature must
affirmatively and continually act for the flow of public finance
to continue. Administered cross-subsidies reverse the default:
the legislature must act to end them. The latter method of
finance should be more durable. And greater expected
durability promotes efficient reliance ex ante, encouraging the
growth of infrastructure-dependent systems and thus
augmenting downstream spillovers. To be sure, greater
durability does not mean permanence. The deregulatory wave
of the late twentieth century showed that internal cross-
subsidies may succumb to sustained ideological assault. But
surely direct public subsidies would have proved even less
resilient.
At any rate, these questions of funding are moot in the case
at hand. In the fully insourced setting described above, the
cost of universal service would be just another expense item
for the central bank, deducted from the central bank's
portfolio earnings before those earnings are remitted to the
fiscal authority. In effect, universal service would be funded
out of general revenue, through a reduction in seigniorage.
Presumably, this would continue to be true under outsourcing.
As described in Part II, in a Demsetz auction framework, the
government continues to accrue seigniorage revenue from
chartered banks. This amount equates to Rf + P - D, where Rf
is the risk-free rate corresponding to the bank's asset portfolio
duration, P is the risk premium, and D is the administered
deposit rate.334 Funding universal service out of general
revenue would mean folding its cost into D; in other words,
reducing banks' periodic seigniorage payments to the
government.
334 See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text.
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Implementation would present some challenges, but this is
equally true in all the infrastructural contexts mentioned
above.335 Regulators would have to devise ways of measuring
banks' compliance with universal service mandates. Where
multiple banks operate within a single geographic area, some
method of allocation would be needed. This issue is
manageable; transportation regulators dealt with similar
issues in allocating airline and motor carrier routes prior to
deregulation. It is not my purpose to spell out in detail how a
universal service mandate might be implemented in the bank
account context. Rather, I have sought to show that there are
established regulatory models for bringing universal service
to the mainstream payment system-and that there are
powerful reasons to consider doing so.
Stepping back, one again sees that the money paradigm
affords a perspective on bank regulation that differs
fundamentally from the intermediation paradigm. In the
intermediation paradigm, access to bank accounts-the core
of the mainstream payment system-is a matter of private
concern. It is up to the banks to decide which customers to
serve. Naturally, unprofitable customers do not get access.
Public interference in such matters is presumptively
disfavored. The money paradigm, which envisages a bank
charter as a monetary outsourcing contract, offers a very
different vantage point. Universal service becomes one of the
terms of the bargain, a "spec" of the procurement
335 There is precedent abroad: Canadian banks are required to open
accounts for applicants unless an enumerated exception applies. The
exceptions generally relate to fraud prevention. See Access to Basic Banking
Services Regulations, SOR/2003-184 (Can.),
http://lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/SOR-2003-184.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7MJ-
W4QB]; see also Ash Demirguc-Kunt, Leora Klapper, Dorothe Singer &
Peter Van Oudheusden, The Global Findex Database 2014: Measuring
Financial Inclusion Around the World 83-84 (World Bank Grp., Policy
Research Working Paper No. 7255, 2015),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/187761468179367706/pdf/WPS
7255.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8G5-5QZ5] (finding bank account penetration
in Canada, as well as other in developed economies like Germany and the
United Kingdom, is at or exceeds ninety-nine percent).
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arrangement. Under this view, access to bank accounts, like
interest on bank accounts, is a matter of public concern, not a
matter to be left to banks' profit-and-loss calculations.
V. CONCLUSION
"[The government] has a monopoly on the issuance of
money, though it has chosen to give up part of its monopoly
powers by permitting commercial banks to operate with
fractional required reserves."336 So wrote Milton Friedman in
1960. He described regulated banks as "issuers of money."
337
This money paradigm fell out of fashion long ago. Its
abandonment was unwise. The money paradigm suggests
lines of regulatory analysis that the intermediation paradigm
practically forecloses. Should "market" forces determine how
much interest is paid on bank-issued money? Should (dollar-
denominated) money creation be characterized by free entry?
Should profit-and-loss considerations determine who gets
access to the mainstream payment system? The money
paradigm, which envisions a bank charter as a monetary
outsourcing contract or franchise arrangement, affords an
organizational framework for thinking about these matters. It
suggests grounds for imposing rate regulation, entry
restriction, and universal service mandates on chartered
banks. And traditional infrastructure regulation furnishes
proof-of-concept that this regulatory model is workable.
Modern U.S. bank regulation has drifted ever-further away
from the infrastructure model, with questionable results.
336 FRIEDMAN, supra note 31, at 74.
337 Id. at 8.
No. 3:757] MONEY AS INFRASTRUCTURE
